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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the waterfront revitalization
experience in Jersey City, N.J . In particular, the issue of
gentrification, as perceived by the city administration, was
examined to determine its impact on current city policies. A
direct relationship between perceptions of gentrification and
waterfront revitalization policies is suggested based on data
obtained from detailed interviews and city documents.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM OBJECTIVE
The present decade has exhibited a growing concern in
and revitalization of the urban waterfront. Waterfront
development along the nation's coasts and rivers has often
been touted by politicians and developers as a panacea that
provides recreational facilities , housing, public access,
aesthetic functions, tax relief, and prosperity. Develop-
ment projects have often brought new vigor and appeal to
many abandoned piers and desolated areas along the
waterfront.
A number of coastal city governments have discovered,
much to their dismay, that waterfront revitalization can be
a double-edged sword . Waterfront projects can attract
middle- and high-income residents and workers into areas
formerly dominated by low- and working-class employees.
This phenomenon is referred to as gentrification . Gentrifi-
cation can also result in alterations in land use patterns.
aside from changes in the composition of neighborhood
populations (London. 1980).
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Generally, gentrification is identified when low- and
middle-income families are displaced by residents of a
higher socio-economic class. A project that occurs along a
vacant industrial waterfront is not considered an example of
gentrification because permanent residents are not dis-
placed. However, the potential for gentrification exists.
Lang (1982) argues that gentrification is a secondary pro-
cess that can be a direct result of public spending pro-
grams . Private market speculators will invest money in
areas near Federally-funded projects. This private market
speculation may attract the middle class and can result in
the displacement of the original residents. This definition
is applicable to the waterfront because waterfront develop-
ments are often financed with Federal funds.
Even if such projects are financed by private invest-
ments or through a private /public partnership, gentrifica-
cation may occur . Other speculators will perceive the area
as potentially profitable for additional development and
will choose to invest near those areas which are undergoing
redevelopment. This secondary speculation and development
may cause displacement, even if the initial project or proj-
ects did not. Even if no other development along the water-
front occurs, the sUbsequent speculation for land-based
development may impact a city's social, physical , and
economic fabric (Waterfront World. September /October,
1987).
2
Gentrification along the urban waterfront has created
some unexpected political and social developments. These
include the fear that immigration of high-income residents
and workers will irreparably destroy the social fabric of
the city and the perception of the resident population that
its very way of life is threatened. This perception can be
pervasive and may influence sUbsequent political agendas and
land use policies. Affluent housing and white-collar
commercial developments represent the predominant land use
along refurbished urban waterfronts.
Waterfront policies and regulations help to establish
the direction and magnitude of present and future recrea-
tional, commercial, and residential developments. The man-
ner in which a municipality chooses to redevelop its water -
front may have important economic and environmental impli-
cations. Any phenomenon affecting waterfront policies and
regulations should be explored because a change in land use
can alter the socio-environmental landscape and
concomitantly, community behavioral patterns.
This thesis is designed to answer the question of how
perceptions of gentrification have influenced waterfront
revitalization policies. The objective of this research is
to assess the impact of perceptions of gentrification. The
following questions will be explored: (1) How influential
have gentrification issues become in determining waterfront
policies? (2) What are the perceived effects of gentrifica-
3
tion? Why do these perceptions exist? (3) How has gentri-
fication become a political issue? (4) How has gentrifica-
tion changed land-use policies? and (5) What specific poli-
cies have been responsible for these changes?
STUDY SITE
The sheer volume of waterfront redevelopment in the New
York-New Jersey metropolitan area is staggering. Thirty-
eight projects are planned for New York City, with 18 loca-
ted in Manhattan and Queens (Waterfront Projects Currently
Under Review or Recently Approved. Waterfront and Open Space
Division. New York City Department of City Planning. 1988).
The Northern New Jersey waterfront. stretching approximately
18 miles. is a formerly industrial and marine transportation
center that is in the process of being converted·into mixed
commercial and residential uses (Figure 1). Redevelopment
in this area is intense. For example . of the 37 waterfront
projects proposed along the New Jersey urban shoreline. 17
are planned for Jersey City. N.J. (On the Waterfront. Spring
1988).
The city has an ethnically mixed population of 220.248
situated within 14.65 square miles (1985 Test Census.
General Population and Housing Statistics). The city is
located on the Hudson River across from Manhattan. and in
recent years has become a very attractive living and working
area. Jersey City was chosen as the area in which to test
4
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the above questions because of the numerous controversial
issues that have resulted from waterfront development in the
past few years (Waterfront World. September /October 1985).
The redevelopment has effected the social and political
system in the city. The current mayor of Jersey City prom-
ised that rampant development would be moderated and that
the waterfront would be available to everyone (Waterfront
World. September /October 1985). This promise was made in
response to perceived fears that the waterfront would become
dominated by upper-class interests. In this context, Jersey
City may be a prototype for other industrial waterfronts
that are currently sUbject to revitalization.
Much· of the waterfront properties in Jersey City were
vacant prior to current development proposals or zoned for
industrial uses. Although the conversion of the industrial
waterfront into mixed-use commercial and residential devel-
opments may not have displaced residents directly, it has
nonetheless sparked concern over possible displacement,
potential conflicts between newcomers and residents, and the
future of the waterfront (Waterfront World. September /
October 1987).
No statistical evidence currently exists that demon-
strates the effects of new development and the resulting
gentrification that may occur. The city has recently begun
to study the gentrification process. Specifically, it is
hoped that the research will qualify and quantify the extent
6
of gentrification in the city. The project will analyze
real estate data, among other sources (Spooner, 1988).
Decisions concerning the future of the waterfront presumedly
have been based on the perceived effects of gentrification.
This thesis will assess how the residents and city officials
perceive gentrification and if gentrification has affected
waterfront revitalization policies.
JUSTIFICATION FOR AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
This thesis draws upon three bodies of literature -
urban revitalization and gentrification, waterfront develop-
ment and revitalization, and environmental perception. Pre-
viously, these fields have only been linked peripherally.
Much of the early research on gentrification describes
the morphology of the gentrification process, determines its
location, and characterizes the gentrifying class (Laska and
Spain, 1980; Palen and London, 1984; and Schill and Nathan,
1983). Little consensus has been reached by researchers as
to the definition, nature, and effects of gentrification
(Lang, 1982; London 1980; Palen and London, 1984; and Smith
and Williams, 1986) . Questions have been raised related to
the importance of gentrification in the light of continued
urban decline in many parts of the city. Is it a scourge to
the lower and working classes? Can it save our cities? Is
it part of a larger social process? The literature may be
best characterized by its lack of concensus.
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Gentrification usually refers to changes in the urban
residential market, but this is actually only one facet of a
large economic, social, and .s pat i a l Testructuring of space
(Smith and Williams, 1986). Urban revitalization refers to
residential, commercial, and industrial changes, and there-
fore, includes gentrification. Gentrification may take dif-
ferent forms and the actual process or stages of gentrifica-
tion may vary, leading to additional confusion for research-
ers attempting to characterize and quantify the phenomenon
(Beauregard, 1986; DeGiovanni, 1983) . The interplay of
social, political, and economic forces leading to urban re-
vitalization and gentrification are still not completely
understood. Furthermore, the theoretical reasons for
gentrification are still subject to debate.
The conceptual literature on gentrification is sparse,
as Lang (1982), Melchert and Naroff (1986), and Smith (1982)
note. Variants of the life cycle model, in which a city or
neighborhood progresses through distinct states from birth
through maturation and old age to decline, have been cited
as a reason d'etre for gentrification (Gale, 1979, 1980;
Holcomb and Beauregard, 1981; and Lang, 1982) . DeGiovanni
(1983) suggests that these stages may not be as distinct as
was initially believed. Palen and London (1984) attempt to
identify the reasons for urban revitalization. Smith (1979)
and Smith and Lefaivre (1984) explain gentrification in
terms of "rent gap." Under this theory, revitalization will
8
only occur if the potential use for the land differs sub-
stantially from the present land use . Gentrification occurs
when developers discover this disparity, and proceed to
acquire, improve, and resell it at a profit .
Gentrification studies tend to concentrate on the inner
city and central business district ( CBD), not on the water-
front. The central business district has often been located
at the waterfront (Slater, 1974) , even though CBDs of t en
move over time. It is rare that the waterfront is even
mentioned in conjunction with gentrification (exceptions
include Schill and Nathan (1983) and Smith and Williams
(1986)). A literature search conducted in October 1987 by
the University of Rhode Island library staff revealed only
one article discussing gentrification in conjunction with
urban waterfronts.
Viewed in this context , waterfront revitalization may
be seen as nothing more than a permutation of the complex
phenomenon of urban revitalization and gentrification.
There may be some underlying theoretical reason why water-
fronts are attractive areas for gentrification that may be
borne out by later studies. Even if later research does not
verify this contention, certain aspects of waterfront
revitalization are distinguishable and merit consideration
for the following reasons:
9
(1) Former industrial waterfronts within cities
may represent the last remnants of open space.
especially if manufacturing. storage, and transpor-
tation functions have become obsolete. Waterfront
revitalization projects may therefore be extremely
large. possibly larger than revitalization projects
in the inner city where large tracts of open space
may no longer exist.
(2) Planning and implementation for waterfront
revitalization projects are more complex compared to
conventional inner-city projects because the waterfront
occurs along the land-water interface. This interface
is subject to special laws. regulations. and policies
concerning both land and water. Inner-city projects
tend to concern only land.
(3) Since waterfront revitalization projects may
be larger than inner-city projects, the effects of
the development on the municipality may be more
substantial.
(4) Pressures for activities along the water are at
least as intensive as activities in the interior.
Numerous efforts have been made to include only
water-dependent activities along the waterfront, but
this often is not accomplished (e.g., prevalence of
luxury housing along the waterfront).
Furthermore, the number of cities and municipalities
contemplating waterfront revitalization continues to grow.
Even if waterfront revitalization can be included in urban
revitalization, the lack of attention given to waterfronts
in the professional literature is surprising. This thesis
attempts to address the problem.
The voluminous literature on urban waterfront develop-
ment and revitalization is rich in chronicling changes along
the urban waterfront. Several classification schemes have
been developed to better understand the nature of the water-
front. These are, however, highly descriptive and only hint
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at how these developments are changing the nature of the
waterfront and what ramifications redevelopment and revital-
ization have for the waterfront and surrounding communities.
The literature discusses methods for revitalizing water-
fronts (Goodwin, 1987; NOAA. 1980; Sondheimer, 1983; and
Wrenn, 1983). Another group addresses the opportunities for
developing grassroot organizations to work in concert with
municipal governments to improve urban waterfronts (Conserye
Neighborborhoods, 1985; Goldstein and Rowan. 1981;
Hudspeth, 1982; and Manogue, 1980). A third group concerns
the importance of balancing conflicting commercial. resi-
dential, and recreational users, and development and envi-
ronmental interests (Petrillo, 1987; Wrenn 1982, 1983).
With the exception of cursory overviews by Richardson (1986)
and Holcomb and Beauregard (1981), no literature relates
urban waterfront development and revitalization to the lar-
ger issue of urban city revitalization. Currently, no lit-
erature exists that links urban waterfront development and
revitalization policies to the effects of gentrification.
Furthermore. almost no attention has been directed
toward determining how perceptions of gentrification along
the urban waterfront affect policy decisions. Holcomb and
Beauregard (1981) touch briefly on environmental perception
while discussing city-wide revitalization. Manogue (1980),
NOAA (1980), and Wrenn (1983) attribute the interest in
revitalizing the urban waterfront to changing perceptions of
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the role of the waterfront but they are more concerned with
changing uses along the waterfront than why perceptions have
changed. More specifically, Fromer and Sonnenfeldt (1984)
contend that changing realities and perceptions by residents
and developers caused waterfront uses to change and created
a new perception of Jersey City as a "first-class" place to
work and live .
Research on environmental perception has not specifi-
cally addressed the waterfront either, although the impor- .
tance of perception in managing natural resources has been
documented (Craik 1968, 1972; Dynes and Wenger, 1971 ; and
Neiman, 1980). Dynes and Wenger (1971) suggest that we can
understand how public policy is determined by understanding
how community leaders perceive and define problems. Craik
(1972) focuses upon the behavioral patterns of professional
environmental decision-makers to determine how environmental
decisions are made.
This review of the literature demonstrates that no
other study has adequately or systematically addressed the
issue of perceptions of gentrification as related to water-
front revitalization policies. Not only is this issue
timely (Breen, 1988; Sandrof , 1987; and Volk, 1988), but
extremely relevant. Land uses change as perceptions and
opportunities change. Understanding, or at least realizing,
the role of perception in this process, may aid in project-
ing the future of the waterfront.
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Waterfront revitalization can take years to initiate
and develop, so the true impact of the development on the
city may not be discovered until the opportunities for miti-
gating any adverse impacts are gone. This thesis asks what
the impact of waterfront revitalization has been? To what
extent has it been beneficial? Who has benefitted? What
are the externalities? How is Jersey City dealing with
these changes?
These questions are relevant for all types of revitali-
zation, although the emphasis here is on a formerly indus-
trial waterfront. The literature is ambivalent on the bene-
fits of revitalization - Lang (1986) contends the benefits
outweight the costs, DeGiovanni (1984) found that cities
appear to benefit but not as much as they might, and the
benefits are unequally distributed, and Cicin-Sain (1980)
argues that revitalization does not solve the problems of"
the city, but merely shifts them to other locations. This
thesis identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the
waterfront revitalization experience in Jersey City. A
particular point of interest is whether the public believes
that waterfront revitalization is fulfilling the promise of
a better life and an improved city. Also, can the adverse
impacts of waterfront revitalization be mitigated and how?
It is anticipated that the answers to these questions will
complement the research already conducted on urban revitali-
13
zation and perhaps notify other cities wishing to revitalize
their waterfronts that problems will exist and solutions to
those problems are difficult to determine.
HYPOTHESES
It is hypothesized that decisions made by elected
officials and administrators in Jersey City . N.J . are
directly affected by the public's negative perceptions of
gentrification . It is further hypothesized that attitudes
concerning the affects of gentrification along the urban
waterfront can be a powerful force in determining the nature
in which waterfront revitalization is conducted.
METHODOLOGY
Data to support the hypotheses were obtained from
twenty-five detailed personal interviews with city officials
and citizen groups who are involved with and /or affected by
gentrification. The interviews were conducted during April
and May 1988 and were designed to uncover details concerning
the waterfront revitalization experience in Jersey City,
with particular emphasis on the social and economic changes
that have occurred since 1980. Specific points addressed
include the following: (1) perceptions of gentrification
among city officials. administrators. and citizen participa-
tion groups. (2) what differences, if any. exist between
city officials. administrators. and citizen participation
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groups in terms of perceptions of gentrification, and (3)
what city policies have been implemented concerning gentri-
fication. The results were analyzed critically using a
frequency analysis to determine the validity of the
hypothesis. Information concerning recent policies and
issues involving gentrification and waterfront revitali-
zation was obtained from city documents and the aforemen-
tioned interviews. All information received from the
interviews has been kept confidential. Comments made by
participants are referred to as Interview Data.
THESIS ORGANIZATION
This chapter has provided a ~ationale for undertaking
this study and why Jersey City, NJ, was chosen as the study
site . Chapter Two contains necessary historical and
political background on the city to better understand the
forces behind waterfront revitalization. Chapter Three
discusses demographic data for Jersey City to illustrate the
city's decline in the post-World War II period. Chapter
Four describes the waterfront revitalization experience in
the city, replete with examples of several waterfront
developments and their anticipated impacts on the city.
Chapter Five details the hypotheses and methodology used to
support this study . A discussion of the results and
insights to the waterfront revitalization experience is
15
included in Chapter Six . Chapter Seven summarizes the
findings and concludes that the results of this study
provide preliminary support for the original hypotheses.
16
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND ON JERSEY CITY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents historical background on Jersey
City , N.J. , from its early colonization, through its period
of success and fame as a transportation center , to its
subsequent decline as an industrial waterfront and
transportation nexus. Nation-wide and industrial trends and
their applicability to Jersey City are discussed as well.
First, a short history of waterfronts is presented, followed
by a brief history of Jersey City , with particular emphasis
on its waterfront. A section on the government and politics
of Jersey City is included next . This section details the
tumultuous careers of some of Jersey City 's most notorious
personalities. It is included to illustrate the past and
present political situation .
Waterfronts in North America
Early settlers in North America concentrated their
commercial activities along oceans and rivers with protected
harbors and navigable waterways. Waterfront settlements
such as Boston, Newport , New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
17
Charleston, and Savannah became important commercial cities
in the 1700s by linking the colonies to Europe. The water-
fronts not only acted as a marketplace of goods and services
but also as suppliers of information. The difficulty of
overland transport also caused urban development on the Gulf
and Pacific coasts to follow a similar pattern of choosing
navigable waters and protected harbors to establish
communities (Wrenn, 1983).
Settlers continued to rely on the relative ease of
waterborne commerce as they moved westward. Ports were
established along . inland rivers such as the Ohio and
Mississippi. By the 1800s the steamboat became an essential
form of river commerce, linking river and lake cities such
as New Orleans, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh,
and Toronto (Wrenn, 1983) .
Another technological innovation - the railroad -
benefitted some cities yet had a detrimental effect on
others. Railroads were inexpensive, fast, and could reach
areas formerly inaccessible by waterways. Coastal cities
such as Baltimore capitalized on the opportunity to link
rail transport with water transport. However, certain
cities were unable to provide the space necessary for rail-
roads. For example, much of St. Louis' economic viability
was tied to its sUitability for steamboat transport, but
could not provide space for railroad facilities. (Later
railroads were located away from the original waterfront
18
(Wrenn, 1983)). Soon, the overwhelming nature of industrial
uses along the waterfront caused it to become a large, often
privately owned area instead of a traditionally public,
mixed-use facility (Slater, 1974).
Railroads required vast stretches of waterfront land
for railroad tracks and warehouses. Often highways were
built along waterfronts to facilitate transportation, but
also worked to separate the waterfront from the central
city. Technological changes in cargo handling (containeri-
zation) in the 1970s caused the structure of the port and
scale of the industrial waterfront to increase in order to
accommodate container ships and cargo storage. Furthermore ,
airports and highways required additional lands along the
waterfront. Some cities such as New York relocated their
ports away from the commercial district to take advantage of
space for rail connections and containership facilities.
Land uses once associated with shipping (e.g .. warehouses
and industrial plants) relocated along highways and close to
airports. Other modes of transportation - trucks, air-
planes, and trains - reduced the dependence on waterborne
commerce. As a result, the old breakbulk finger piers and
warehouses fell into disuse and were abandoned .
From the colonial period, waterfronts in North America
were devoted primarily to commerce and transportation .
Other sorts of uses were either not envisioned, or consid-
ered to be secondary at best. However, with technological
19
innovations in transportation, changing world trade pat-
terns, the emergence of the United States as a post-indus-
trial service-oriented economy, regional shifts in manufac-
turing, and perhaps other factors, the traditional uses no
longer encompassed the entire waterfront. Furthermore,
cities no longer relied on water transportation to provide
urban growth as the hinterland became accessible. Oppor-
tunities existed for recreational, residential, and light
commercial (retail) uses as well. This was recognized by
the Federal government as early as 1978, when studies of
waterfront projects were conducted by the Heritage Conser-
vation and Recreation Service of the Department of the
Interior, and funding was granted for waterfront redevelop-
ment under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion's (NOAA) Coastal Zone Management Program (NOAA, 1980).
HISTORY OF JERSEY CITY
Jersey City. spanning approximately 11 miles of the
Hudson River along the New Jersey shoreline , was first
visited by Henry Hudson in 1609. The city was originally
colonized by the Dutch . The British took over the Dutch
settlement in 1664, lost it in 1673, and finally annexed all
of New Jersey by treaty in 1694. In 1776, the Revolutionary
Army built a fort at Paulus Hook (at that time spelled
Powles), the present-day name of one of the sections of the
city. After the revolution, Alexander Hamilton tried to
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promote the development of the waterfront by establishing
the Society for Establishing Useful Manufacturers (1791) and
the Associates of the Jersey Company (1804). Hamilton's
untimely death slowed the activities of these two organiza-
tions, which were responsible for arranging and supervising
development of the land now comprising Jersey City and much
of Hudson County (Jersey City Waterfront Study Blight
Report, 1972). However, the Associates of the Jersey Com-
pany persevered and many facets of their original plan for a
grid of residential streets, city squares, and commercial
thoroughfares to the waterfr~nt were ultimately developed
(Brooks, 1982) .
The population in Jersey City grew exponentially
during the 1800s and continued to grow until 1930. After
1930, population began to drop.
POPULATION OF JERSEY CITY, 1840 to 1950
YEAR
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
Source :
POPULATION
3,072
6,856
29,226
82,546
120,722
163,003
206,433
267 ,779
298,103
316,715
301,173
299,017
U.S. Census of Population
21
The city began as a farming, fishing, and clamming commu-
nity . Some shipping and indus~ry had gained a foothold in
the city by the 1830s. This was a result of the aggressive
efforts of real estate speculators from New York and the
city's land connections and proximity to Manhattan. Jersey
City's waterfront development followed a pattern similar to
most other northeastern waterfronts. Like many other ports,
Jersey City became a commerce and transportation center .
Marginal piers dating from colonial times were replaced with
finger piers. Ferries operated between Paulus Hook and
Staten Island, while direct stagecoaches connected Jersey
City to other cities and towns as far as Philadelphia.
Robert Fulton operated a shipyard at Paulus Hook from 1804
to 1850 , where the first steamship was built. The York and
Jersey Steamboat Ferry Company also established itself along
the New Jersey side of the Hudson River in 1810, but
survived only five years before going out of business.
Development along the New Jersey side of the Hudson
River continued during the nineteenth century. The New
Jersey Railroad was constructed in 1834. The hinterland was
opened with the construction of the Morris Canal in 1835,
enabling goods to be shipped as far as 100 miles to the
west. Hudson County became an important "intervening
transportation opportunity" between New York City and the
hinterland . As the accessibility to the hinterland
increased, manufacturing (primarily glass, pottery, and
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foundaries) established itself in Hudson County and serviced
new markets. By the time of Jersey City 's incorporation as
a city1 in 1838, the infrastructure was no longer strictly
agrarian-based and instead oriented itself toward manufac-
turing and transportation (Brooks, 1982). Cunard Shipping
Line established a base in the city in 1847, soon folllowed
by the White Star Shipping Lines and the New York-Erie Rail-
road . All goods traveling east to New York or west from New
York passed through New Jersy, in particular, Jersey City.
Goods could be transported by rail over land and by barge or
ship across the Hudson River.
A major development contributing to Jersey City's
reputation as a railroad center was an 1834 agreement be-
tween New Jersey and New York. The maritime boundary was
established in the middle of the Hudson River, which gave
New Jersey title to its own waterfront. Prior to that, New
York City claimed ownership of the Hudson River and both its
shores , a claim Alexander Hamilton tried to discount before
his death (Brooks, 1982). The railroads, namely the New
Jersey Railroad (later the Pennsylvania Railroad), the
Paterson and Hudson Railroad (later the Erie Railroad) , and
the Central Railroad of New Jersey, established lines and
terminals along the Jersey City waterfront. The original
waterfront, mostly marshland, was filled in over time
(usually with garbage) to accommodate burgeoning railroad
operations .
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Railroads were particularly important to Jersey City's
development as a transportation center. However, signs of
decline in freight were evident after World War II. During
a 20-year period (between 1939 and 1959), total annual
freight in tons decreased by over 4,000,000 tons, roughly 23
percent (Port of New York Authority, Port Development
Department, Planning Division, cited in Jersey City Water-
front Study Blight Report, 1972). Also, many of the east-
ern railroads merged during the 1960s. By 1967, the three
major eastern rail systems became the Pennsylvania-New York
Central system, Norfolk and Western System, and the Chesa-
peake and Ohio-Baltimore and Ohio system. By 1970, Penn
Central, Lehigh Valley (owned by Penn Central), and Central
Railroad of New Jersey,2 all along the Jersey City water-
front, filed for bankruptcy. Only the Erie-Lackawanna Rail-
road remained. All passenger service to Jersey City was
diverted to the Erie-Lackawanna Terminal in Hoboken. which
is currently the arrival and departure point of NJ Transit
lines. Mergers allowed the railroads to eliminate extrane-
ous terminals and railyards. This resulted in substantial
decreases in freight and passenger traffic entering the
city. The railroad-owned waterfront in Jersey City declined
from 76 percent to 46 percent between 1939 and 1959. The
railroads once owned 2,508 acres; after the mergers, this
figure had declined to 1.518 acres (Jersey City Waterfront
Study Blight Report. 1972).
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The supremacy of the railroads was challenged by the
advent of the automobile. After World War II truck and air
transport competed with the railroads for cargo. Railroads
lost anthracite and bituminous coal cargo when major utili-
ties converted to oil in the 1950s. These losses were
compounded by the railroads' reluctance to develop new
methods of operation (Comprehensive Waterfront Plan, 1971).
Also critical to Jersey City were the activities of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey . The Port Authority
was established in 1921 and is responsible for developing
"terminal transportation and other facilities of commerce in
the New York-New Jersey region. ,,3
Instead of reinvestments into the transportation· in-
frastructure in Jersey City, more efficient and modern
facilities were developed in Ports Elizabeth and Newark,
south of Jersey City. Shipping operations were planned for
Port Elizabeth; rail operations were developed in Port
Newark . Ports Elizabeth and Newark. with extensive storage
and marshalling yards, benefitted from the advent of con-
tainerization at the expense of the marine terminals in
Hudson County and Lower Manhattan. Ferries and passenger
ships also sUffered . The extensive highway systems.
bridges, and tunnels, which were developed during the 1960s
and 1970s, contributed to the demise of the ferries that
transported passengers across the Hudson. Exchange Place,
in Jersey City, once a stop for cargo and travelers on their
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way to New York City, relinquished its position as the hub
of the metropolitan area to Penn Station in Manhattan after
the completion of the Pennsylvania Railroad tunnel connect-
ing New Jersey with Manhattan in 1912. The Holland Tunnel
opened in 1927 to accommodate vehicular traffic. In 1968,
the Port Authority consolidated passenger ship terminals in
New York City. Figure 2 illustrates the transportation
linkages to New York City from Jersey City.
The possibility of building a tunnel under the Hudson
River was considered as early as 1860. The project was de-
layed through court action by the Delaware and Lackawanna
Railroad , which recognized the impact such a development
would have on ferry revenues once the tunnel was completed.
The project was revived in 1874, 1879, 1889 . and finally was
reorganized and financed under the aegis of the Hudson and
Manhattan Railroad Company in 1902. The tunnel, or "tube,"
became a reality on July 19, 1909. The system ran from the
Delaware and Lackawanna Terminal in Hoboken , N.J. (directly
north of Jersey City) to Morton Street in Manhattan.
Another tunnel linked Hoboken with the "uptown" line, which
included stations on Christopher Street , 9th Street , 14th
Street, and 23rd Street. The "downt own " line connected
Exchange Place in Jersey City to Cortland Street in
Manhattan. The line was extended to include Pavonia Station
in Jersey City. Twin 22-story office buildings were built
at Cortland and Fulton streets in Lower Manhattan to serve
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as railroad headquarters. These buildings, on the site of
the World Trade Towers, were rented by many of the railroads
for ticket offices. By 1910, the system included a tube
between Exchange Place and Grove/Henderson Street Station in
Jersey City. During the following two years, the tubes
connected stations in Newark , Harrison, and Journal Square
(also in Jersey City) . The system is currently run by the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, who assumed
control in 1962. The system was renamed the Port Authority
Trans Hudson (PATH), and in 1987 boasted a ridership of 58.3
million passengers (Pathways, May 1988). The original
routes have remained the same although the stations have
been and continue to be remodeled and expanded (Hudson and
Manhattan Railroad, included as part of the Newport City
,
Development Project, DEIS, 1983).
Ferries usually took 29 minutes to cross the Hudson
River. By constrast, the tubes took from 3 to 20 minutes ,
depending on points of origin and destination. The ferries
operated in Jersey City from 1661 to 1958. The last ferry
in Hoboken ceased operation in 1967 (Cotterell, 1984).
Ironically, twenty years later, ferry transport has again
come in vogue due to traffic congestion on bridges and tun-
nels leading into New York City.
The Regional Plan Association projected that the de-
cline of waterfront shipping and manufacturing would present
an opportunity for residential, commercial, and recreational
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facilities (The Lower Hudson, 1966). Howeve~, this oppor-
tunity was delayed by the collapse of rail companies, bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and rail reorganization (River City,
1985). The waterfront had been changed physically by the
era of the railroad and was dominated by industrial (manu-
facturing and warehouse) and transportation (railroad and
shipping) use. The shaded areas in Figure 3 represent many
of the railroad lands along the waterfront. The waterfront
was primarily reserved for boat yards, pierside facilities,
junk and scrap iron yards, railroad and transfer yards and
oil storage facilities . An army reserve center was still
operating by the Caven Point Army Terminal and some
residential areas existed by the Statute of Liberty drive
area until the 1970s. The waterfront was littered with old
barges and derelict watercraft , yet another indication of
its decline.
The Jersey City Waterfront Study Blight Report (1972)
assayed the waterfront and found that the once-thriving in-
dust rial and transportation facilities were mostly abandoned
and deteriorated. The report classified most of the build-
ings along the waterfront as poor, defined as
" ... generally uneconomical to correct.
Deficiencies such as cracks, holes, rotting,
missing of materials over large areas, severe
sagging and warping of structural members,
and severe rotting and weathering of windows and
door frames are common to poor structures. Poor
structures also include buildings considered to
have been inadequately constructed and also
structures which have been rendered sub-standard
due to fire, flood or act of God."
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FIGURE 3
THE INDUSTRIAL WATERFRONT
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Port-related industries in 1970 consisted of three
major general cargo· piers on the Hudson River, one of which
was inactive. Many of the specialized harbor facilities
were vacant or abandoned. Very little residential develop-
ment existed (approximately 87 structures) along the water-
front and was interspersed throughout commercial and indus-
trial areas. (Most residential development was concentrated
in the Downtown ward of Jersey City). Almost no retail de-
velopment existed and most commercial development was con-
centrated in or near Exchange Place (Comprehensive Water-
front Plan, 1971).
A visionary Comprehensive Waterfront Plan had been com-
pleted by the Division of Planning in 1971. The report pro-
posed "creating an essentially new relationship between the
city and the river" and suggested the waterfront be used for
commercial, residential, recreational, multiple, and indus-
trial uses. Waterfront plazas, a state park (later to be
Liberty State Park, completed in 1976), waterfront espla-
nades to provide public access,4 marinas, and new residen-
tial communities were suggested . Projections indicated the
plan could provide $37 million in tax revenues, create em-
ployment for 50,000 people, and result in 35,000 housing
units. The 1972 blight report was a second stage in rede-
veloping the waterfront. By declaring the waterfront a
blighted area under N.J.S. 40:55-21.1, the Redevelopment
Agency could take control of city-owned land and begin to
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revitalize and redevelop the area through the use of Federal
funds. The cost of either rehabilitating existing struc-
tures or demolishing existing buildings is shared by the
Federal government and the locality. The actual redevelop-
ment of the waterfront occurred years after the 1971 and
1972 reports.
Problems such as numerous waterfront property owners
(e.g ., federal, city, different railroads, other private
owners) were not settled until the late 1970s. Other issues
mentioned in the report, such as a lack of long-term city
planning, speculative efforts, and the city's failure to
take an active role in waterfront developments are still
true today, Also mentioned as constraints to future devel-
opment were limited highway access linking the New Jersey
Turnpike to the waterfront and the lack of municipal infra-
structure such as sewer and water lines .
The State of New Jersey was also involved in planning
efforts along the waterfront. Funds were provided to
conduct a study of possible mixed-use developments along the
Hudson riverfront in Jersey City in 1979 (New York Times.
September 16, 1979). Also that same year the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey published a report depicting the
present state and probable future needs of the New York-New
Jersey port district. The report concluded that redevelop-
ment of the inner harbor waterfront was feasible and desir-
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able. although economic. physical. political. and environ-
mental constraints were noted (The Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, 1979) .
POLITICS
A general sense of the political forces in Jersey City
is essential as politics in Jersey City is inexorably tied
to the past. present. and future of the city. This section
traces the political realities in Jersey City from the domi-
nation of Mayor Frank "Boss" Hague in the early 1900s to the
present.
Like many other northeast cities. Jersey City was buf-
feted by waves of immigrants. especially due to the city 's
proximity to lower Manhattan and Ellis Island. Jersey City
was dominated by white ango-saxon protestants (WASPs) in the
late eighteenth century. In a scenario reminiscent of
Burgess' (1925) invasion-succession theory , the city was
host to three very broad waves of immigrants - the Irish and
Germans. the Italians and Poles. and the Blacks and Hispan-
ics. The most recent immigrants have been Asian Indians.
As elsewhere, politics in Jersey City was and is reflective
of the relative strength of competing interest groups.
Nepotism and patronage have long been characteristic
of politics in Jersey City and Hudson County, starting from
the Hague years. Political machines were commonplace and
virtually indestructible until the 1970s . Even if the po-
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litical organizations have been dismantled, it is likely
that for some, the memory of them lives on and the "shadow"
of Boss Hague still pervades politics in Jersey City. Since
the 1970s, politics has been characterized by a turnover of
the city administration every four years. a large number of
candidates running for mayor, runoff elections, and com-
plaints of nepotism, favoritism, and patronage in the City
Administration. The various administrations have also
vacillated from progressive to conservative.
Beginning in the late 1800s, as middle- and upper-class
white anglo-saxons and other northern Europeans left Jersey
City for the suburbs, the Irish and other remaining European
groups upgraded into the newly vacated homes. Frank Hague,
an Irishman, was perceived as a local Irish boy "made good."
His reign of mayor of Jersey City lasted from 1917 to 1947.
His political base was built upon the dominant Irish contin-
gent in Jersey City, as well as other European groups who
preferred an Irish to an Italian mayor (Varacalli, 1983).
The city was run according to a commission form of govern-
ment whereby five city commissioners were elected in a city-
wide primary. This system functioned from 1913 until 1961
and allowed Hague to create campaign tickets comprising four
Irishmen and one WASP. Hague used this strategy throughout
his tenure as mayor, helping to create the adage "One
Irishman is worth four other workers."
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Hague is notorious for consolidating his power in
Jersey City and Hudson County and controlling city and
county politics until his death in 1956. Hague's success,
never duplicated by sUbsequent city mayors, was due to his
ability to co-opt the business community, legal community,
church, ethnic leaders, organized crime, and the media.
Most patronage positions went to Irishmen - the other ethnic
groups were largely ignored and then only given token repre-
sentation to ensure votes from various ethnic groups
(Varracalli, 1983).
During his reign. Hague controlled gubernatorial nomi-
nations by generating over one-third of the total votes in
the statewide democratic primaries. In general elections,
Hudson County majorities could bring victory to whatever
candidate Hague endorsed. By 1922 , he assumed formal com-
mand of the state Democratic party and two y~ars later, was
vice-chairman of the National Democratic Party. As a sign
of his domination, he contrplled the governorship of New
Jersey for all but six years between 1920 and 1941, as well
as distributing state, county, and city patronage positions
(Rosenthal and Blydenburgh, 1975).
Hague officially retired from Jersey City politics in
1947 when he installed his nephew, Frank Hague Eggers, as
mayor. However , Hague still controlled city and county po-
litics until his death in 1956, by which time the machine he
had created was beginning to erode. Ethnic groups protested
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.. their lack of patronage positions, other growing counties in
New Jersey challenged Hague's domination, and the Democratic
governor broke with Hague after 1941 (the next two state
governors were Republican). Eggers was no substitute for
his uncle and when Hague died, much of his organization died
with him.
Eggers was challenged for control of the city in 1949 by
John V. Kenny, also an Irishman, who took advantage of
Hague's crumbling patronage style. Kenny became mayor in
1949 by uniting discontent ethnic groups . He never managed
to assemble an organization as powerful as that of Hague's,
but was either directly or indirectly influential in Jersey
City and Hudson County politics until 1971. Kenny's
strength lay in his ability as a power broker. Known as
"promising Johnny," he maintained his power base by provid-
ing patronage positions and playing ethnic groups against
each other. Alliances were forged and broken as necessary,
sometimes from one election to the next.
Kenny was only mayor from 1947 to 1953, mainly because
he made too many promises to supporters that were never kept
and his opponents exposed his possible ties to organized
crime. Although Kenny was never mayor of Jersey City again,
he was directly responsible for the tenure of Bernard Berry
from 1953 to 1957. Furthermore, Kenny was skilled at
switching political sides. In 1957, Thomas Gangemi , Sr., a
remnant of the Hague /Eggers machine, challenged Berry and
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Kenny with the help of former state senator, Edward Q'Mara.
Gangemi and Q'Mara developed a mixed ethnic ticket known as
the Victory ticket. Although Gangemi's fellow candidates
won, he himself did not. Charles Witkowski held office from
1957 to 1961. Kenny was instrumental in destroying the Vic-
tory Ticket party by convincing Gangemi to defect from his
own party. Kenny promised the defeated Italian the position
of Hudson County Supervisor, if Gangemi would merge his
organization with Kenny 's . As Gangemi sided with Kenny,
Witkowski was unable to hold the demoralized party together,
and the Victory Party crumbled.
By the 1961 election, Jersey City altered its form of
government . The Faulker Act allowed municipalities in New
Jersey to choose among several forms of government. Jersey
City chose a strong mayor-council plan with nine councilmen
to be elected from each of six wards and three elected at-
large. Known as Plan C, it was expected to guarantee more
minority representation. In 1961 , the newly forged
Gangemi-Kenny alliance challenged Kenny's former ally,
Bernard Berry, Witkowski, and three other candidates.
Gangemi was elected mayor in 1961, but was controlled by
Kenny. who succeeded in creating dissention among both the
city council and the mayor and between ethnic groups. The
1961 election was also the first time in the history of
Jersey City that a black was elected as a councilman, demon-
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strating the importance of the Black-American constituency.
Since then, the Bergen-Lafayette council seat has been
considered a black seat (Varacalli , 1983).
Twenty-six months later it was discovered that Gangemi
was not a U.S. citizen and as a consequence, he resigned .
Kenny abandoned Gangemi and encouraged councilmen to support
Thomas Whelan as mayor. According to his usual style, Kenny
promised city jobs and favors to the councilmen who support-
ed Whelan. Whelan, noted for his business orientation, was
backed by Kenny in the formal 1965 election. Gangemi, who
had since solved his citizenship problem, ran against Whelan
as did five other candidates including ex-mayor Witkowski.
Whelan rid the city government of Gangemi followers and in-
stalled his own people . Although the Irish only comprised
10 percent of the city population, more than 40 percent of
the committeemen and city officials were Irish (Lemmey,
1978) .
In 1969 Gangemi attempted to regain the mayoral seat
once more with the help of John J. Kenny - a disgruntled
protege of John V. Kenny. John J. Kenny, the county leader,
assembled a faction commonly referred to as the "courthouse
gang" that disagreed with Whelan's "Grove Street" faction.
Whelan and his group attempted to bring professional talent
to the organization. The "courthouse gang" disliked the
opposing faction's tactics, and John J. Kenny attempted to
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topple the entire Whelan/Kenny organization. John J. Kenny
was unsuccessful and Whelan was elected in 1969 (Varacalli,
1983) .
By 1970, blatant scandel had hit Jersey City. Whelan,
John V. Kenny, and ten others in the city and county govern-
ment - known as the "Hudson Twelve" - were indicted by the
Federal government for taking kickbacks for city and county
contracts. Whelan, the only mayor of Jersey City to win two
consecutive formal elections since Hague, spent seven years
in the Federal penitentiary. John V. Kenny and the city
council president were also indicted.
Before his indictment, John V. Kenny allegedly con-
vinced the city council to support his choices for temporary
mayor and council president until a special election was
held in 1971. Charles Krieger held office until the Novem-
ber election. Out of the 18 candidates that ran, Paul
Jordan - a young, clean-cut, liberal professional who
appeared to be an alternative to the corrupt politics of the
past - was elected mayor. Jordan also won in the regular
election in 1973, over Thomas "Buddy" Gangemi, Jr., son of
former mayor Gangemi .
The common perception of Jordan was that of a liberal
reformer, a perception that probably contributed to his
triumph over old-time, possibly corrupt politicians. Unlike
his notorious predecessors, Jordan was not skilled at man-
aging patronage or solidifying his power base. He was ac-
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cused of alienating working-class whites and ethnics by
catering to Blacks and Hispanics in a city that was still
dominated in spirit, if not in numbers, by Irish and
Italians. Also, Jordan was unable to prevent taxes from
rising while services declined, a problem most of the
northeast faced in the 1970s.
While Jordan may have represented the start of a new
political order, he may have been too liberal for Jersey
City, a city that had long been a blue-collar, working-class
industrial area. Jersey City's reputation as a rail trans-
por"tation center had slowly and steadily declined after
World War II. In response to this, Jordan initiated plans
for waterfront revitalization (Comprehensive Waterfront
Plan, 1971) .
Furthermore, between 1950 and 1970 , the industrial base
of Jersey City eroded. Employment in construction, durable
and nondurable goods, manufacturing, transportation, whole-
sale and retail trade, and personal services declined even
faster than the decline in overall employment in the city.
By 1970, Jersey City was overrepresented in relatively low-
paying, low status jobs and underrepresented in professional
and technical high-paying, high prestige jobs. All this
occurred during a period when the city's problems and re-
sponsibilities increased as its resources declined (An
Analysis of the Economic Structure of Jersey City, 1975).
Despite a history of over 50 years of domination by politi-
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cal machines, the city may not have been ready to accept a
new political regime . Varacalli (1983) suggests that many
Jersey City residents perceive the world of politics as
foreign and beyond their control. He contends this is
because the city was and still is significantly comprised of
working class and working poor. Many residents voted out of
fear - the economic fear of losing jobs tied to the local
political organization, fear of losing favors and advan-
tages, fear of losing familar surroundings, and the fear of
perceived intrusion by outsiders. Other residents voted for
more positive reasons, such as to promote themselves, their
families, or their lifestyles.
The 1970s were a particularly bleak period for Jersey
City (Interview Data, 1988). Perhaps most indicative of
this were the results of a citizen participation study con-
ducted in 1974. Over 50 percent of the household respon-
dents indicated that they did not take action on neighbor-
hood problems because they believed it would do little good
to complain or did not know who to complain to, and only
27.3 percent of all residents surveyed attempted to do
anything about neighborhood problems between 1972 and 1974
(Citizen Participation in Jersey City, 1974) .
Many working class residents may have been suspicious
of Jordan's reform government . When Jordan decided to run
for governcir in .1977 , he supported William Macchi, a middle-
class professional for mayor, who lost to Thomas F .X. Smith,
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a former Kenny supporter. Smith, who was backed by the
Gangemis, was an Irish-Catholic from Jersey City who under-
stood how party politics worked. He was more of an old-time
politician than Jordan ever was. A pattern started to
evolve whereby the city administration changed every four
years as a new mayor was elected. Also, the administrations
vacillated from liberal, professional mayors to old-style
politicians .
Smith also encountered problems during his 1977-1981
tenure as mayor . He was unable to reconcile the profes-
sionals in his administration with the old-time regular
organization. Fighting between the two factions became
vitriolic . Two councilmen, Gerald McCann and Anthony Cucci,
took advantage of this disorder to run for mayor in 1981.
McCann was portrayed as a conservative, business-o~iented,
prodevelopment candidate; Cucci was more liberal and sym-
pathetic to the poor and minorities. McCann and Cucci, once
close friends, became political rivals. When the Cucci cam-
paign ran out of money, Cucci supported Smith's candidate,
Wally Sheil. Despite this, McCann still won the 1981
election and brought eight new concilmen with him .
McCann, mayor from 1981 to 1984, is generally credited
with initiating multi-million dollar, mixed-use developments
along the waterfront. A number of Jersey City master plans
had suggested plans for revitalizing the waterfront as far
back as 1912, with renewed attempts made in 1920, 1951, and
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1966. These attempts culminated in a Comprehensive Water-
front Plan in 1971 and a Waterfront Study Blight Report in
1972 (written under the Jordan administration). McCann was
business-oriented and appealed to the middle class. His ad-
ministration was characterized by professional people and a
pro-development stance. However, he was also perceived as
insensitive to the lower-class minorities and the elderly.
His critics claimed he sold the city to developers (some of
which were personal friends), sold city-owned buildings with
tenants in them to developers, and was a threat to minorites
and the poor. At worst, McCann was accused of .being an
arrogant, insulting racist who saw no place for minorities
and the poor in Jersey City . While some of this may have
been correct, it is also likely that certain goups (e .g.,
the media, people disenchanted with the political regime)
preyed upon the fears of the poor and minorities (Interview
Data, 1988).
Nonetheless, negative perceptions caused McCann's
demise . The Cucci Coalition challenged McCann in 1985.
Cucci was portrayed as a candidate who cared about the "lit-
tle people ." He promised to provide affordable housing and
to control the flurry of development his predec~ssor had
started, as well as ensuring that long-time residents, most-
ly renters , would not be forced from their homes. Gentrifi-
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cation was seen as part of the housing and displacement
issue. Cucci enterrea City Hall in 1985 and brought with
him eight new councilmen.
Cucci is credited with bringing a new sensitivity to
the city and built his administration on the concept of a
city for everyone. Gentrification became a popular phrase
in 1984 ; however, some people claim it was merely a rallying
cry used by the Cucci Coalition to gain City Hall. Cucci
proposed to fight the effects of uncontrolled development by
creating a new housing stock for low- and moderate-income
groups. This housing would be created through renovation
and new affordable housing. Unfortunately, much of the land
in the city is already developed or committed to developers,
merely compounding the problem (Interview Data, 1988).
Cucci's critics claim the mayor cannot control his
council , and is overwhelmed by the development in the city.
His administration is accused of nepotism, fiscal mismanage-
ment, and favoritism (traits also used to describe previous
administrations). On the positive side, the Cucci Admini-
stration has also been credited with being more accessible
and responsive to the public. At best, Cucci is believed to
be well-meaning but unable to deal effectively with the
problems of the city. The public appears to be particularly
dissatisfied by the lack of affordable housing in the city
and the increasing tax rate (see Chapter Six for more
detail) (Interview Data , 1988).
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CONCLUSION
Since the 1970s administrations in Jersey City have
been characterized by short life expectancies. No mayor has
ever been elected to serve a second term in office. The
heads of city departments change in response to each new
mayor, be he progressive or conservative. Consequently,
there is little political continuity. Some participants
interviewed for this study believed that candidates won, not
so much for their platforms, but because the public decided
any new candidate was better than the previous mayor. With
the constant turnover in the city administration and
Vitriolic campaign battles. it is likely that the publiC is
confused and uncertain.
The impact of waterfront revitalization, in this con-
text, is complicated because so much of it is based on po-
litical negotiation. Allegations of political misdemeanors
are commonplace, as is criticism and cynicism. While some
informants described this as "politics as usual," developers
and residents may be dismayed and confused by the lack of
continuity . Out of necessity, politics in Jersey City
represents the "cost of doing business" in the city.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO
lIn 1820, Paulus Hook was incorporated as the City of
Jersey. The name was changed to Jersey City in 1938 .
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2The Central Railroad of New Jersey in Jersey City,
which runs parallel to the New Jersey Turnpike, was acquired
by NJ Transit.
3The politics of the Port Authority are discussed
elsewhere in Danielson and Doig (1982).
4 I n 1982, the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection presented a plan for a proposed 18-mile linear
park stretching from the George Washington Bridge to Bayonne
named the Hudson Waterfront Walkway. The Regional Plan
Association advocated such a plan as early as 1966 in its
study . The Lower Hudson. The concept continued to develop
with the Final Report of the Hudson River Waterfront Study
(1980), the New Jersey Trails Plan (1982), and the Draft
1983 New Jersey State Outdoor Recreation Program. In 1984
the Hudson Waterfront Walkway Plan and Design Guidelines
were promulgated. Currently. the State is negotiating with
individual municipalities concerning specifics of the
va.Lkvay,
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CHAPTER THREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR JERSEY CITY
INTRODUCTION
Descriptive indicators from the U.S. Census of Popula-
tion are explained in some detail to better illustrate
Jersey City's decline after World War II. While conditions
in Jersey City were particularly bleak between 1970 and
1980, as was the case in many other industrially dominated
cities, indicators for the current decade suggest a renais-
sance may be occurring. As will be discussed in later chap-
ters, this renaissance coincides with waterfront revitaliza-
tion.
DESCRIPTIVE INDICATORS
Since World War II, suburbs have expanded as a result of
changing economic and demographic condition, often at the
expense of central cities. Federal housing acts such as the
1949 Housing Act and the 1954 Omnibus Housing Acts encour-
aged suburban expansion. Even the National Defense Highway
Act of 1956 spurred suburbanization as the Act provided good
access from the suburbs to the cities. By the 1950s and
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1960s, more growth was occurring in the suburbs than in the
central cities. Not only did industries and employees move
to the suburbs. but industrial employment experienced both
an absolute and relative decrease. The rise in service em-
ployment was not enough to offset the loss. Demographic
changes occurred in the cities as the white middle class
fled, leaving behind the poorer black and hispanic contin-
gents. The remaining populations could not carry the tax
burden and many cities were confronted with fiscal crisis
during the 1960s and 1970s .
City officials believed that the only way to save their
cities was to lure back the middle class. The 1949 Housing
Act precipitated urban renewal in which Federal funds would
be provided to clear slums (blighted areas). The redevel-
oped areas were to be predominantly residential. The pur-
pose of the Act was to provide decent housing for all
citizens . The Act mandated that a qualifying area had to be
at least 50 percent residential in character prior to clear-
ing, or that new development in cleared areas had to be at
least 50 percent residential. Cleared slum areas were often
designated as sites for factories, shopping centers, and
luxury accommodations. Much of the proposed low-income
housing was never constructed because officials assumed the
poor would move into accommodations vacated by the middle
class (Chudacoff, 1981), a process referred to as
"filtering. "
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The 1954 Omnibus Housing Acts continued the policy
established by the 1949 Act. However, the 1954 Act provided
Federal funds for non-residential development projects . One
of the goals was to provide for low-income housing. but like
its predecessor. this goal was never accomplished .
The assumption underlying these two housing acts was
that the benefits arising from the return of the middle
class to the cities and the revitalization of the business
districts would filter down to the lower classes. In
reality . what often occurred was that as slums were cleared.
the lower classes were displaced and moved to other slums.
Often the cost of the Federally-funded low-cost housing was
prohibitive. Studies have shown that these urban renewal
politics decreased the number of housing units. and urban
renewal may have been a very expensive proposition socially.
particularly in terms of displacement (Chudacoff. 1981;
Fainstein et al., 1986) . Furthermore. the population of
cities has continued to decrease (U.S. Census Qf PQpulatiQn.
1970. 1980).
CQnditiQns in Jersey City reflect the characteristics Qf
Qlder cities as described by Fainstein et al. (1986). A
substantial ethnic /minority pQpulatiQn exists . and the city
Qriginally was based Qn an industrial eCQnQmy that is nQW
switching tQ a service economy. In additiQn. the housing
~tQck is Qld. and mQst land is already developed. General-
ly. since World War II . many Qlder eastern central cities in
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the U.S . have lost their middle class populations, some or
all of which has been made up of minority populations,
poverty levels have increased, and economic bases have
deteriorated. The descriptive statistics from the U.S.
Census of Population presented below indicate that Jersey
City is characteristic of most older, northeastern cities .
Although the purpose of this thesis is not to demon-
strate the existence of gentrification through an analysis
of census data, it is nontheless instructive to note some of
the changes in population composition and demographics that
the city has experienced . The following data is adapted
from the U.S . Census of Population and the 1985 Test Census
of Jersey City:1 Additional sources are referenced on the
tables that follow .
Population
Table 1, The Population of Jersey City, Hudson County,
and New Jersey, 1930-1987, shows that population in both
Jersey City and Hudson County has declined since 1930. The
greatest loss in population in Jersey City occurred between
1970 and 1980 when 37,013 residents , or 14.2 percent of the
population, left. Population in Jersey City continued to
fall, albeit at a much slower rate, between 1980 and 1985,
when the city lost 3,284 residents, or 1.5 percent of its
population. Table 2, Total Population by Ward, illustrates
the population loss by individual city wards. However,
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TABLE 1
POPULATION OF JERSEY CITY, HUDSON COUNTY, AND NEW JERSEY
1930-1987
JERSEY CITY HUDSON COUNTY NEW JERSEY
1930 316,715 690,730 4,041,334
1940 301,173 652,040 4,160,165
1950 229,017 647,437 4 ,835,329
1960 276,101- 610,734 6,066,782
1970 260;545 609,266 7 ,168,164
1980 . 223,532 556,972 7,365,823
1985 220,248a 557,075b b7,561,000
(218,576)
1987 223,684c 551,790d d7,620 ,000
aThis figure was obtained from the 1985 Test Census of
Jersey City. The figure in parentheses is the estimate
provided by the Official State Estimates, Population
Estimates for New Jersey, July 1 , 1986 , Department of Labor ,
Division of Planning and Research, Office of Demographic and
Economic Analysis.
Figures for Hudson County and New Jersey were obtained from
Official State Estimates, Population Estimates for New
Jersey, July I, 1986, Department of Labor, Division of
Planning and Research , Office of Demographic and Economic
Analysis.
cThe figure of 223,684 is an estimate provided by the
~epartment of Housing and Economic Development, Jersey City.
These figures were obtained from the Official State
Estimates, Population Estimates for New Jersey, and
represent 1986 levels.
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'TABLE 2
Jersey City
TOTAL POPULATION
By Ward
========================:======================= PERCENT CHANGE
WARDS I 1970 1980 1985 1987 . 1970-1980 1980-1987
========================================ESTIMATE===================
Greenville
WARD-A 37,632 34,440 33,483 33,809 -8.5% -2.8%
Percent 14.4% 15.4% 15.2% 15.1%
Westside
WARD-B 44,143 37,326 38,589 39,139 -15.4% 3.4%
U1 Percent 16.9% 16.7% 17.5% 17.5%IV
Journal Sq.
WARD-C 45,484 42,065 41,375 41,710 -7.5% -1.6%
Percent 17.5% 18.8% 18.8% 18.6%
Heights
WARD-D 40,471 36,392 36,905 37,245 -10.1% 1.4%
Percent 15.5% 16.3% 16.8% 16.7%
Downtown
WARD-E 46,597 36,247 34,835 35,818 -22.2% -3.9%
Percent 17.9% 16.2% 15.8% 16.0%
Bergen
WARD-F 46,218 37,062 35,061 35,964 -1·9.8% -5.4%
Percent 17.7% 16.6% 15.9% 16.1%
-------------------------------------------------------------------_.
-------------------------------------------------------------------_.
JERSEY CITY
260,545 223,532 220,248 223,684 -14.2% -1.5%
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
estimates for 1987 generated by the Jersey City Department
of Housing and Economic Development suggest that the
population is stabilizing and may even be increasing. 2
Figure 4 illustrates the location of the six wards that
constitute the city.
Figure 5, Jersey City Population, 1950-2000, Current
Estimate and Projections, graphically demonstrates the pop-
ulation decrease since World War II. It is evident that the
population in 1985 was the lowest the city has ever experi-
enced. Population is projected to increase as waterfront
development projects are completed , which is expected to
occur by 1994.
Demo~raphics
The city has alsO changed in terms of racial composi-
tion . Generally , as the white population decreased, the
minority populations have increased , especially the black
and hispanic populations. Table 3, Racial Composition of
Jersey City and New Jersey, 1950-1987, illustrates this
trend. From 1950 to 1980, Jersey City 's ethnic composition
changed dramatically. In 1950 almost 93 percent of Jersey
City was white. Twenty years later, 58 percent of the
population was white , 28 percent black, and 19 percent
hispanic . The 1985 Test Census indicated that the white
population contined to decrease, the black population was
stabilizing, and the hispanic and asian populations were
increasing. Estimates for 1987 depict the population as 51
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FIGU RE 5
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TABLE 3
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY AND NEW JERSEY
1950-1987
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985a: 1987.D PERCEIlT CHANGE
1970-1~BO 1980-1987
JERSEY CITY 299 .017 276 .101 260,545 223,532 220.248 223,684 -14 .2'1. 0 .1"
White 278 .051 238.827 202,813 129.699 112 .930 114 .692 -36 .0'1. 11.5"
(92 .9" ) (86.5'1.) (77 .8") (58'1.) ~51. 3'1.) (51. 3'1.)
Black 20.758 36 ,692 54.595 61.954 60.781 61 ,996 13 .5'1. 0.1"
(7 .0'1.) (13 .3'l) (21. 0'1.) (27.7'l ) (27 .6'l) (27 .7'l )
Hispanicc NA NA 23 .729 41.672 46 ,193 46 ,224 75.6'l 10.9'l
NA IlA (9.1'l) (18.6'l) (21.. ) (20.7'l)
Other 208d 582 e 3,137e 24.086 f 30 .093 30 .114 NA 25 ..
(0 .07'1.) (0.2'1.) (1 . 2'l) (11'l) (13.6'l) (13 .5'1.)
Asian NA NA NA 9,793 16 .444 16 .445 NA 68 ..
NA NA NA (4 .4'1.) (7 .5'1.) (7 .4'l)
U1 NEW JERSEY 4,835 .329 6.066.782 7.168.164 7.364,823
""
White 4.511.585 5,539,003 6,349.908 5.840.229 - 8 .0"
(93.3'1.) (91.3'l) (88 .6'1.) (79.3'1.)
Black 318.565 514.875 770.292 906,931 17 .7"
(6 .6'1.) (8.5") (l0.7'l) (12.3'l)
Hispanicc NA NA 135,676 494.096 264.2'l
NA NA ( 1. 8'l) (6.7'l)
Other 5,179d 12.904e 47.964e 17 .069f -64.4'l
(0 .12'1.) (0 .21'l) (0 .66'l) (0 .2'l)
Asian NA NA NA 106 .498 NA
NA NA NA (1 .4'l)
aData for 1985 are taken from the 1985 Test Census for Jersey
£;ty .
~stimates for 1987 vere provided by the Urban Research 8
Design Division. Depa=tment of Housing and , Economic
Development . Jersey C~ty .
cSispanic population includes any race .
dIncludes A=erican I~dian, JaD~ese. Chinese. and others .
eIncludes Acerican I~dian. Japanese. Chinese. Filipino . and
~thers.
In the 1980 census the "other" category vas included in the
"Race, n .e.c ." category . This includes persons vho did not
include the~selves ~n any of the other categories .
percent white, 28 percent black, 21 percent hispanic, and
7.4 percent asian. The State of New Jersey has also become
more diverse, but population in the state has been rising,
whereas population in Jersey City, until recently, has
continually declined .
Between 1970 and 1980, Jersey City lost 37,013 resi-
dents. The white population decreased by 73,114 people,
while 7,359 more black and 17,943 hispanics moved into the
city. Even this influx could not halt the general popula-
tion decline. Table 3 also shows that by 1985, the white
population continued to decline, while the hispanic popula-
tion increased. The black population began to stabilize.
Estimates by race for 1987 are illustrated in Figure 6 and
indicate that all population groups are stabilizing.
Individual wards within the city also reflect this
general trend. This is demonstrated by the figures in
Tables 4 through 9. Ward A, Greenville, heavily dominated
by whites in 1970 (91.3 percent), experienced a substantial
black and hispanic influx by 1980. By 1985, all groups,
except the white population, had increased. Ward B,
Westside, followed city-wide trends, but in 1970 was more
racially diverse than Greenville, but less racially diverse
than the city as a whole. Ward C, Journal Square, lost
almost 60 percent of its white population in 15 years and
saw a dramatic increase in the number of hispanics and
asians. Ward D, the Heights, was almost all white in 1970.
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JERSEY CITY POPULATION BY RACE
1970 - 1987
280 I 1
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
o I." '/ .'('1". 1/ I ' [//1'0.] 1/ I '\~ I "r~ I"\~ I/I\.V~
JER.CITY WHITE BLACK ASIAN OD-lER HtSPANIC
tz::zI 1970 TurAL POPULs;T10N BY R..'>.CE[s:::sJ 1 900 f22Zj 1 9 85 ~ JAN 1987
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING A~D ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JERSEY CITY, NJ
1987
TABLE 4
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD A, GREENVILLE, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
GREENVILLE
Population 37,632 34,440 33,483 - 8.5% - 2.8%
White 34,344 22,869 19,241 -33 .4% -15.9%
(91.3%)a (66.4%) (57.5%)
Black 3,092 8,724 9,443 182 .1% 8 .2%
(8.2%) (25.3%) (28 .2%)
Hispanicb 943 3,485 4,904 269.6% 40.7%
(2.5%) (10.1%) (14 .6%)
Asian NA 1,009 1,674 NA 65.9%
(2.9%) (5 .0%)
Otherc 196 1,838 3,125 840.0% 70.0%
(0 .5%) (5.3%) (9.3%)
•
aNumbers in parentheses represent percentages.
bIncludes any race.
cAs defined by the U.S . Census .
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TABLE 5
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD B, WESTSIDE, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
WESTSIDE
Population 44,143 37,326 38,589 -15.4% 3.4%
White 36,708 23,359 20,646 -36.4% -11.6%
(83.2%)a (62.6%) (53.5%)
Black 7,161 9,701 10,533 35.5% 8.6%
06.2%) (26.0%) (27.3%)
Hispanicb 1,853 5,061 6,759 173.1% 33.6%
(4.2%) (13.6%) (17 .5%)
Asian NA 1,575 2,655 NA 68.6%
(4.2%) (6.9%)
Otherc 274 2,691 4 ,755 882.0% 76 .7%
(0.6%) (7.2%) (12.3%)
aNumbers in parentheses represent percentages
bIncludes any race .
CAs defined by the U.S. Census .
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TABLE 6
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD C, JOURNAL S'\lUARE, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
JOURNAL S'\lUARE
Population 45,484 42,065 41 ,375 - 7.5% - 1.6%
White 42,824 28,903 25 ,322 -32 .5% -12.4%
(94.2%)a ( 6 8 . 7%) (61.2%)
Black 1,478 2,217 2 ,309 50.0% 4.1%
(3.2%) (5.3%) (5.6%)
Hispanicb 3,742 9,439 9,991 152.2% 5.8%
(8 .2%) (22.4%) (24'.1%)
Asian NA 4,763 7,040 NA 47.8%
(11.3%) (17 .0%)
Otherc 1,182 6,182 6,704 423.0% 8.4%
(2 .6%) (14.7%) (16 .2%)
~Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
Includes any race.
CAs defined by the U.S .' Census.
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TABLE 7
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD D, HEIGHTS, 1970-1985
HEIGHTS
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
Population 40,471 36,392 36,905 -10.1% 1.4%
White
Black
Hispanicb
Asian
Otherc
40,146 33,124 30,104
(99.2%)a (91.0%) (81.6%)
123 321 266
(0.3%) (0.9%) (0.7%)
1,933 5,808 8 ,186
(4.8%) (16.0%) (22.2%)
NA 699 1,847
(1 .9%) (5.0%)
202 2,248 4,688
(0 .5%) (6.2%) (12 .7%)
-17.5%
161.0%
200 .5%
NA
1012.8%
- 9.1%
-17 .1%
40 .9%
164 .2%
108.5%
aNumbers in parentheses represent percentages .
bIncludes any race.
cAS defined by the U.S. Census.
62
TABLE 8
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD E, DOWNTOWN, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
DOWNTOWN
Population 46,597 36,247 34,835 -22.2% - 3.9%
White 33,839 15,322 13,930 -54.7% - 9.1%
(72.6%)a (42.3%) (40.0%)
Black 11,870 9,598 9,012 -19.1% - 6.1%
(25.5%) (26.5%) (25.9%)
Hispanicb 13,372 16,067 13,855 20.2% -13.8%
(28.7%) (44.3%) (39 .8%)
Asian NA 1,264 2,447 NA 93.6%
(3.5%) (7.0%)
Otherc 888 10,063 9,446 1033 .2% - 6.1%
(1.9%) (27.8%) (27.1%)
~Nurnbers in parentheses represent perc~ntages.
Includes any race.
cAs defined by the U.S. Census.
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TABLE 9
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF JERSEY CITY BY WARD
WARD F, BERGEN, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
BERGEN
Population 46,218 37,062 35,061 -19.8% - 5.4%
White 14,952 4,122 3,687 -72.4% -10.6%
(32.4%)a (11.1%) (10.5%)
Black 30,871 31,393 29,218 1. 7% - 6 .9%
(66.8%) (84.7%) (83.3%)
Hispanicb 1,886 1,812 2,498 - 3 .9% 37 .9%
(4.1%) (4.9%) (7.1%)
Asian NA 483 781 NA 61.7%
(1. 3%) (2.2%)
Other c 395 1,064 1,375 169.3% 29.2%
(0.9%) (2.9%) (3.9%)
aNumbers in parentheses represent percentages .
bIncludes any race.
cAS defined by the U.S. Census.
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By 1985, the white population had dropped by one-third,
while the hispanic, asian, and other3 populations
increased. The Heights still has the largest white
population in the city (81.6 percent in 1985) and the
smallest number of blacks (0.7 percent).
Ward E, Downtown, the site of major waterfront devel-
opments and gentrification, lost more population between
1980 and 1985 than any other ward. Much of its white popu-
lation declined between 1970 and 1980, while the hispanic
population increased over 20 percent. The black population
dro~ped in absolute numbers, but not in relative terms. The
hispanic population decreased between 1980 and 1985, a phe-
nomenon that only occurred in the Downtown ward. This may
be a result of displacement.
Finally, Bergen, Ward F, always dominated by the black
population, lost over 70 percent of its white population
between 1970 and 1980. During that decade, the black pop-
ulation only showed a small increase in numbers, but domi-
nated in terms of percentage composition. Between 1980 and
1985, both the black and white population fell as the his-
panic, asian, and other3 populations rose.
Industrial Mix
Not only has the number of employed persons in Jersey
City declined as population has decreased, which indicates a
shrinking economic base, but the mix of industries has
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changed as well to reflect a shift away from the manufac-
turing and industrial occupations toward more professional
occupations . Table 10, Industry of Employed Persons in
Jersey City, 1950-1987, lists the numbers of the employed
persons and percentages of employed persons per industry.
Despite some minor flucuations. ~he total number of persons
employed per industry has declined in most cases.
Between 1950 and 1987, the total number of persons em-
ployed in Jersey City fell from 124,029 in 1950 to 89,368 by
1987. a reduction of 34,661 jobs. or 28 percent. Of the
twelve industries4 that employ persons in Jersey City.
nine declined in absolute numbers between 1950 and 1987, two
industries increased. and one industry remained relatively
stable. The number of persons employed in Construction de-
creased by 51 percent; ManUfacturing. by 43 percent; Trans-
portation. by 38 percent; Communications, by 43 percent;
Wholesale Trade by 29 percent; Retail Trade by 35 percent;
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate by 10 percent; Personal.
Entertainment, and Recreation Services by 54 percent; and
Public Administraation by 11 percent. The number of persons
employed in Business and Repair Services and Professional
and Related Services increased by 34 percent and 60 percent,
respectively. Only Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and
Mining remained fairly constant between 1950 and 1987. Al-
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TABLE 10
INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS I II J ERSEY CI':'Y
1950-1987
INDUS:'"Y 1950 1960 1970 191:0 1985 1987a PERCENT CHAl;GE
1950- 1987
TOTAL EMPLOYED 124 .092 112 .172 105.172 88.239 llA 89 . 368 -28%
Agr i.. Fo r .. 23'; . 137 299 187 ~;A 194 -17%
Fish . 1/ Mining ( 0 . 2%)D ( 0 . 1% ) ( 0. 3%) (0 . 2% ) ( 0 .2 %)
Const::,ucti on 4.919 3 .865 3.61 6 2.331 !/A 2.417 -51%
(4 .0%) ( 3 . 4%) ( 3 .4%) (2 .6%) (2 .7%)
Manufacturing 40,620 37 ,268 30.913 22,433 NA 22 .998 -43%
( 32. 8%) (33 ,2%) (29.4% ) ( 25 . 4%) ( 25 . 7%)
Transportation 15,743 11.737 9.143 9.802 NA 9 ,758 -38%
(l 2. 7%) (l0 .5%) ( 8 . 7%) (11.1% ) (10 .9%)
CODUll. 1/ Public 4.133 3.51 2 4 .072 2,256 NA 2 .377 -43%
Utilitie s ( 3. 3%) ( 3 . 1%) ( 3. 9%) (2.6% ) (2 .7%)
0'\
-..J Wholesale Trade 6.069 4,174 4.321 4.319 NA 4 .321 -29%( 4. 9%) ( 3 . 8%) ( 4 .1 %) ( 4 . 9%) (4 .8%)
Retail Trade 16, 233 13,046 12 ,902 10.368 NA 10 .537 -35%(1 3.1%) (11 .6%) ( 12 . 3%) (11.7% ) (11. 8% )
Fin ., I::sur . 1/ 9.046 7 ,733 10 .068 7. 987 ~iA 8 .126 -1O'l>
Re a:" Estate (7 . 3%) ( 6 . 9%) ( 9. 6%) ( 9 . ~% ) (9 .1%)
Busi::ess & Re- 2 .890 3 . 02 2 3 .698 3 . E35 ~;A 3 .867 +34%
pa~::- Services (2 . 3%) ( 2. 7%) ( 3. 7%) (4 . 3\ ) (4 .3%)
Per ., Er:ter . 1/ 6 .141 6 .36 3 4 .M7 2. 695 !IA 2 ,810
- 54'l>
Rec . Se rvi ce s ( 5 . 0%) ( 5 . 7%) ( 4. 6\) ( 3 . :'l ) (3 .1%)
Pr ofessional 1/ 10.471 10 .297 14 .47 0 16 ,9 65 llA 16 .801 +60%
Re1a-:ed Serices ( 8 . 4%) ( 9 . 2%) (13 .6%) 09 . 2%) (1 8 . 8%)
Pub1':'c AdI:lini- 5 .821 5,46: 6 .625 5.:C6 ~;A 5 .161 -11%
stra-:':'cn (4 . 7%) ( 4 . 9%) ( 6. 3%) ( 5.7%) ( 5 . 8%)
Indus-:::'i e s Not 1 . 709 5 .55C
Re:;: c::--:ed ( 1 . 4%) ( 4 . 9%)
aSsti::-ates for ~957 ~ere provided ty the Urba:: Researc~ 1/
Des i g:: uivi sic:: . :epart~er:t of Housi ::g and Ecc~cmic
~evel c :: ::,.e r.t. Je:- s e ': Ci ty .
Fi g~::-es in b::- acke~s are percentages
though this industry fell by 17 percent, it only employs ap-
proximately 200 persons and represents a very small segment
(0.1 to 0.3 percent) of the population (Table 10).
Manufacturing, which at one time employed over 30 per-
cent of all persons in Jersey City, has declined steadily
since 1950. The total number of persons in Jersey City
employed in the Manufacturing jobs in 1950 totalled 40,620
(32.8 percent); by 1987, only 22 ,998 (25.7 percent) persons
were employed in manufacturing. This represents a decrease
in employment of 17,622. or 43 .4 percent in 37 years. In
1950 Manufacturing represented the largest industry in the
City; by 1987 manufacturing was still the largest industry,
with the Professional and Related Services in second place.
As occurred elsewhere in the Northeast, Jersey City, once
noted as a manufacturing, industrial, and transportation
center. found its major industries declining.
The Transportation industry, which employed 12.7 per-
cent (15,743) of all employed persons in 1950, dropped to
8.7 percent in 1970 a loss of 6,600 persons, or 42 percent.
Transportation, once the third largest industry in Jersey
City. was the fourth largest industry in terms of number of
persons employed in 1987. The number of persons employed in
Transportation declined steadily until 1970. By 1980, the
industry expanded by 7.2 percent (659 more persons
employed). Some of those gains were lost by 1987 as the
industry declined slightly by 0.4 percent (44 persons).
68
The number of persons employed in the Wholesale Trade
industry, the seventh largest industry in both 1950 and
1987, fluctuated from 6,069 persons employed in 1950 to
4,321 persons in 1987, a decrease of 1,748 persons, or 29
percent. However, the percentage of persons employed in the
Wholesale Trade industry in 1950 (4.9 percent) is very close
to the percentage of persons employed 37 years later (4.8
percent). While the absolute number of persons employed has
decreased, the percentage of persons employed in the
industry has remained relatively constant. This suggests
that the industry has shrunk in direct proportion to the
population decline.
The Retail Trade industry has also lost employees. In
general, retail trade has fluctuated more than wholesale
trade. Retail trade was once the second largest industry in
Jersey City. In 37 years, the industry has declined from
16,233 employed persons to 10,537, with the greatest losses
occurring between 1950 and 1960 (19.6 percent decline) and
1970 and 1980 (19.6 percent decline). Between 1950 and
1980, the industry lost 5,865 employees. A very slight
increase of 169 persons (1 .6 percent) was noted by 1987,
making Retail Trade the third largest industry in the city.
The Finance, Insurance and Real Estate industry, the
fifth largest industry in 1950, employed 9,046 persons in
1950. That number dropped in 1960 to 7,733, increased by 30
percent in 1970 (to 10,068 employees) , dropped by 21 percent
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by 1980, and increased very slightly (1.7 percent) by 1987.
The number of persons employed by the industry peaked in
1970, when the industry was the fourth largest. By 1987,
the industry ranked fifth. Fewer persons were employed in
the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industry by 1987
(8,126 persons) than in 1950 (9,046 persons), representing
an overall loss of 10 percent.
The Business and Repair Services industry is one of
the few industries in the city that increased in percentages
of persons employed from 1950 to 1987 . In 1950, this indus -
try employed 2,890 persons (2.3 percent of all persons em-
ployed) and rose fairly consistently until 1970, after which
the industry lost only 58 persons. By 1980, the ~ndustry
gained 32 persons, or 0.8 percent. Business and Repair
Services, the ~leventh largest industry in 1950, was the
eighth largest industry by 1987 and employed 3 ,867 persons,
representing an increase of 34 percent since 1950.
The Personal, Entertainment, and Recreation Services
industry declined from 6,141 persons employed (5.0 percent
of all persons employed) in 1950 to 2,810 persons (3 .1 per-
cent of all persons employed) in 1987, a decrease of 60 per-
cent. The industry, the sixth largest in 1950, became the
ninth largest by 1987. The industry peaked in 1960 with
6,363 persons employed and subsequently has been dropping
ever since, except for a slight comeback in 1987.
70
The Professional and Related Services industry, which
includes the health and educational services, is the only
industry to show substantial gains since 1950. In 1950,
10,471 persons (8.4 percent of all persons employed) were
working in this industry; by 1987 , 16,801 persons (18.8 per-
cent of all persons employed) were employed, an increase of
6,330 persons, or 60 percent. In 1950, this industry was
the fourth largest in the city; 37 years later, it became
the second largest. The industry peaked in 1980 with a
total of 16,968 persons employed (19.2 percent of all per-
sons employed), an increase of 17.3 percent since 1970. It
fell by 1 .0 percent by 1987 .
Finally, the Public Administration industry fluctuated
slightly between 1950 and 1987. In 1950, the industry con-
stituted 4.7 percent of all persons employed, or 5,821 per-
sons, making it the eighth largest industry. The number of
employed persons in the industry fell by 1960 by 6 percent
but increased by 1970 by 21 percent. The gains made by 1970
were lost by 1980 as the ~umber of persons employed declined
by 23.7 percent. By 1987, the industry had improved slight-
ly (2.1 percent), but overall, the industry lost 660 per -
sons, or 11 percent between 1950 and 1987.
With the exceptions of the Business and Repair Ser-
vices, the Professional and Related Services, and the Agri-
culture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining industries, which to-
gether constituted only 23.3 percent of the persons employed
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in 1987 in Jersey City, all other industries exhibited de-
clines since 1950. Table 11, Industry of Employed Persons
in Jersey City, 1970-1987, reflects the shrinking industrial
base in the city within the past two decades. All indus-
tries, except for Transportation, Wholesale Trade, and Pro-
fessional and Related Services, employed less people in 1980
than in 1970 , a period when many other cities faced fiscal
crises, increasing taxes, declining services, and vast
changes in city population. The loss of 16,933 jobs between
1970 and 1980 was felt mostly in the manufacturing industry
(a 27.4 percent decline, or loss of 8,480 positions), retail
trade (a 19.6 percent decline, or loss of 2,534 jobs), fi-
nance , insurance , and real estate (a 20.7 percent decline,
or loss of 2,081 employees), communications and public
utilities (a 44.6 percent decline, or loss of 1,816 jobs),
personal, entertainment, and recreation services (a 44.4
percent decline, or a loss of 2 ,152 positions) and public
administration (a 23.7 percent decline, or loss of 1,569
jobs). These losses were not offset by increases in the
transportation sector or the Professional and Related
Services. However, the city exhibited some improvement
between 1980 and 1987, perhaps signaling the start of a
renaissance . For the first time since 1950, the total
number of employed persons increased by 1.3 percent. Table
11 shows slight increased for almost all industries, except
for Transportation and Professional and Related Services.
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TABLE 11
INDUSTRY OF E~PLOYED PERSOllS III JERSEY CITY
1970-1987
INDUS7RY 1970 1980 1985 1987 a PERCEll'!' CHAlIGE
1970- 1980 '98Q- '987
TOTAL EMPLOYED 105.172 88.239 NA 89 .368 -16 .1% 1.3%
Ag,:.. For . . 299. 187 194 -37 .5% 4.J'"
Fis!l . & Kining (0 .3%)D (0 .2%) llA (0 .2%)
Cons-oruct1on 3.616 2 .331 NA 2 .417 -35 .5% 3 .7%
(3.4% ) ( 2 . 6%) (2 .7%)
ManufaCturing 30.913 22 .433 NA 22 .998 -27 .4% 2.5%
( 29 . 4%) (25 .4% ) (25 .7%)
TranspOrtat10n 9.143 9 .802 NA . 9 .758 7 .2% -0 .4%
(8.7% ) (11. 1% ) (10 .9%)
CO= . & Public 4.072 2.256 IIA 2 .377 -44 .6% 5.4%
-.J Utili ties (3 .9%) ( 2. 6%) (2 .7%)
w
'tIbolesa1e Trade 4.319 4.321 NA 4.321 0 .0% 0 .0%
(4 .1%) (4 .9%) (4 .8%)
Retail Tracie 12.902 10.368 NA 10 .537 -19 .6% 1.6%
(12.3% ) (11. 7% ) (11.8%)
Fi~ . . Insur. & 10 .068 7.987 ~;A 8 .126 -20 .7% 1.7'i
Rea:" Esta't:e ( 9 . 6~ , ( 9 . 1%) ( 9 . a)
Bus::.ess & Re- 3.896 3 .835 :IA 3 .867 - 1 .6% 0.5'1
pa.::- Services (3.7% ) ( 4 . 3%) ( 4. 3%)
Per . . Enter . & 4.8..7 2 .695 1;J.. 2 .810 -H.4% ';.31.
Ree . Services (4 .6%) ( 3 . 1% ) ( 3 . 1%)
Pr c:essi ona1 Ii 1';;.470 16.965 ~:A 16 .801 -17.3% -: .:;'1
Re:' 3:::ed se rv . (13 8~ ) (1 9 . 2%) (l6 .a% )
Publ.ic Ado~r;,i- 6 .625 5 .056 :lA 5 .161 -23 .7% 2 .1'\
st=:e.t:oo (6.3'1 ) (5.7% ) ( 5 . a*)
aEs: ~ates f~r 1937 ~e e urovicieci ~v tee C:=a.n Resea,c~ Y
Des: :. Divisi~!l. ~epa., =e;'t: of 3 c~s~:.g ane Ecc:.omic
Deve cpoe nt . Je,sey Ci y
DFig :es in t:a.ckets a:e percen:ag es .
All other industries increased between 1 and 6 percent from
1980 levels . The Professional and Related Services industry
was unique in exhibiting a slight decline after continual
increases since 1950.
Chan~es in Occupation
Supporting evidence of a shrinking industrial base can
be found by examining the occupations of employed persons in
Jersey City, Table 12. Occupations were separated into six
categories to conform with recent Jersey City documents from
the Urban Research & Design Division, Department of Housing
and Economic Development - Managerial & Professional; Tech-
nical, Sales, and Administrative; Service; ' Far mi ng , Fores-
try, & Fishing, Craft & Repair; and Operators, Fabricators,
& Laborors.
Table 12 illustrates that the city lost 35,790 workers
between 1950 and 1980, a decrease of 28.8 percent. The
greatest loss (16 .1 percent) occurred between 1970 and 1980~
when the number of employed persons dropped by 16,933. In
1950, most workers in Jersey City were employed as opera-
tors , fabricators, & laborers (33 percent), followed by
technical, sales, and administrative workers (26.6 percent).
Although this occupation lost employees between 1970 and
1980 , by 1980, 33.9 percent of all persons were employed in
technical, sales, or adminstrative positions.
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TABLE 12
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
1950-1980
OCCUPATION 1950 1960 1970 1980 PERCEllT CHANGE
1950 1980 1970 1980
TOTAL EMPLOYED 124 .029 112 .197 105 .172 88 .239
Managerial & 19.193 15,536 15.910 15.065 -21. 5%
- 5 .3%
Professional 05 .5% )a 03 .9%) 05 .1% ) 07.1% )
Technical. Sales 33.054 29 ,785 32.659 29.913 - 9 .5%
- 8 .4%
& Administra- (26 .6% ) (26 .5%) ( 3 1 . 0%) ( 33 . 9%)
tive
Service 12.552 11.843 13 .671 12 .119 - 3 .4%
-11 .3%
00 .0%) 01 .0%) 03.0% ) ( 13 . 7%)
......
U1 Farming. Fores- 124 56 193 224 81.0% 16 .1%
try & Fishing ( 0 . 1%) CO .05% ) ( 0 . 2%) ( 0 . 3%)
Craft & Repair 17.169 13 .511 11,569 8.508 - 50 . 4%
-26 .4%
03.8%) 02.0% ) 01. 0%) ( 9 . 6%)
Operators. Fab- 40.822 35,383 31. 170 22.410 -45.1%
-28 . 1%
ricators & (33 .0%) (32 .0% ) ( 2 9 . 6%) ( 25 . 4%)
Laborers
Not Reported 1 .115 6.058
( 0 . 9%) ( 5 . 4%)
aF1gures in brackets are percentages .
The number of workers employed in the craft & repair
occupations and the operators. fabricators. & laborer occu-
pations declined sustantially between 1950 and 1980. Over
27.000 jobs were lost in these fields. which represents over
75 percent of the total number of jobs lost between 1950 and
1980. The percentage of employed persons in these two
fields has declined steadily within the 30-year period.
Once 40,822 persons were employed as operators, fabricators,
& laborers; thirty years later, that number had plummeted to
22,410 persons.
Conversely, the percentages of persons employed in ma-
nagerial & professional positions; technical. sales, &
administrative positions; and services position increased
during this same period. Only 4,128 jobs were lost in the
managerial & professional field. The technical, sales, &
administrative occupations only lost 3,141 between 1950 and
1980 . Table 12 also shows that between 1970 and 1980, out
of the 16,933 positions lost in the city, 8.760 .were in the
operator, fabricator, & laborer field , and 3,061 were in the
craft & repair field. Thus, almost 70 percent of all jobs
lost were in these two fields, which could loosely be termed
as the industrial, blue-collar industries . In 30 years, the
industrial base of Jersey City had eroded. Furthermore.
this decline had not been made up by growth in the white-
collar , professional and service sectors .
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The individual wards in Jersey City were affected dif-
ferently as the city's economy changed into a service econo-
my. This is illustrated in Tables 13 through 18. The per-
centage of employed persons working in the managerial & pro-
fessional sector increased in all wards except Westside .
Also, the percentage of persons employed in this industry in
Greenville, Westside, and Journal Square was above the city
averages in 1970 and 1980. The percentage of persons em-
ployed in the technical, sales, & administrative sector in
Greenville, Westside, Journal Square, and the Heights all
exceeded city averages in 1970 and 1980. All wards, except
Downtown, showed an increase in the percentage of persons
employed in the Service sector between 1970 and 1980. As
shown earlier, as the city became less industrial, the craft
& repair, and op~rator, fabricator & laborer occupations de-
clined considerably. Downtown lost 30 percent of its work-
ers between 1970 and 1980, with almost 70 percent of all
jobs lost in the craft & repair. and operator, fabricator. &
laborer field. Bergen was not far behind with almost 65
percent. Even in Journal Square. which only lost 7,540
workers, most were industrial and manufacturing related.
Income Data
Table 19 provides data on income levels in the city .
While median and mean household income almost doubled be-
tween 1970 and 1980, the number of households subsidized
77
TABLE 13
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD A, GREENVILLE
OCCUPATION 1970 1980 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
GREENVILLE
TOTAL EMPLOYED 15,490 13,978 - 9 .7%
Managerial & 2,537 2,673 5.3%
Professional (16.4%)a (19 .1%)
Technical, Sales, 5,272 5,243 - 0.5%
& Administra- (34.0%) (37.5%)
tive
Service 1,621 1.709 4.9%
(10.5%) (12.2%)
Farming, Fores- 19 40 52.5%
try & Fishing (0.1%) (0.3%)
Craft & Repair 1,891 1,249 -33 .9%
(12.2%) (8.9%)
Operators, Fab- 4 ,150 3,064 -26 .0%
ricators & (26.8%) (21 .9%)
Laborers
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
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TABLE 14
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD B, WESTSIDE
OCCUPATION
WESTSIDE
TOTAL EMPLOYED
Managerial &
Professional
Technical , Sales,
& Administra-
tive
Service
Farming . Fores-
try & Fishing
Craft & Repair
Operators, Fab-
ricators &
Laborers
1970
18,426
3,823
(20.7%)a
6,544
(35.5%)
2,027
(11.0%)
19
(0.1%)
1,682
(9.1%)
4,331
(23.5%)
1980
15,173
2,946
(19.4%)
5,311
(35.0%)
2 ,090
(13.8%)
17
(0.1%)
1,404
(9.3%)
3,405
(22.4%)
PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
-17.6%
-22 .3%
-18.8%
3 .1%
-10.1%
-16.5%
-21.4%
aFigures in brackets are percentages .
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TABLE 15
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD C, JOURNAL SQUARE
OCCUPATION
JOURNAL SQUARE
TOTAL EMPLOYED
Managerial &
Professional
Technical, Sales,
& Administra-
tive
Service
Farming, Fores-
try & Fishing
Craft & Repair
Operators, Fab-
ricators &
Laborers
1970
19,030
3,526
(18.5%)a
6,362
(33.4%)
2,431
(12.8%)
15
(0.1%)
2,172
(11. 4%)
4,524
(23.8%)
1980
17,490
3,556
(20.3%)
5,966
(34.1%)
2,265
(13.0%)
11
(0.1%)
1,710
(9 .3%)
3,982
(22.8%)
PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
- 8.1%
0.9%
- 6.2%
- 6.8%
-27.0%
-21.3%
-11.9%
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
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TABLE 16
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD D, HEIGHTS
OCCUPATION 1970 1980 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
HEIGHTS
TOTAL EMPLOYED 16,789 15,436 - 8.1%
Managerial & 2,199 2,270 3.2%
Professional (13.1%)a (14.7%)
Technical , Sales , 5,507 5,789 5.1%
& Administra- (32.8%) (37.5%)
tive
Service 1,992 1,771 -11.1%
(11.4%) (11. 5%)
Farming . Fores- 0 87
try & Fishing (0.0%) (0.6%)
Craft & Repa.i r 2,418 1 ,867 -22.7%
(14.4%) (12 .1%)
Operators. Fab- 4,743 3 ,652 -23.0%
ricators & (28.3%) (23 .7%)
Laborers
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
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TABLE 17
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD E, DOWNTOWN
OCCUPATION
DOWNTOWN
TOTAL EMPLOYED
Managerial &
Professional
Technical, Sales,
& Administra-
tive
Service
Farming, Fores-
try & Fishing
Craft & Repair
Operators, Fab-
ricators &
Laborers
1970
17,366
1,799
(10.4%)a
3,828
(22.0%)
2,973
(17.1%)
28
(0.2%)
1,700
(9.8%)
7,038
(40.5%)
1980
12,314
1,770
(14.4%)
3,384
(27.5%)
1,885
(15 .3%)
40
(0.3%)
1,164
(9.5%)
4,071
(33.1%)
PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
-30.0%
- 1 .6%
-11.6%
-36.6%
42.8%
-42.2%
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
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TABLE 18
OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN JERSEY CITY
BY WARD, 1970-1980
WARD F, BERGEN
OCCUPATION 1970 1980 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980
BERGEN
TOTAL EMPLOYED 18 ,071 13,848 ' - 23 . 4%
Managerial & 2 ,026 1,850 - 8.6%
Professional (11 .2%)a (13.4%)
Technical, Sales, 5,146 4,220 -18.0%
& Administra- (28 .5%) (30.5%)
tive
Service 2,697 2 ,399 -11 .0%
(14 .9%) (17.3%)
Farming, Fores- 112 29 -74.0%
try & Fishing (0 .6%) (0.2%)
Craft & Repair 1 ,706 1,114 -35.0%
(9 .4%) (8.0%)
Operators, Fab- 6,384 4,236 -33.6%
ricators & (35.3%) (30 .6%)
Laborers
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
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TABLE 19
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY INCOME IN JERSEY CITY
1970-1987
1970 1980 1987 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980 1987
HOUSEHOLD
Median Household Income $ 7,569 $12,787 $18,076 68.9% 41.1%
Mean Household Income $ 8,529 $15,872 $24,071 86.1% 51.7%
Number of Households 87,853 80,720 81,196 - 8.1% 0.6%
co With Social Security I 14,997 21,786 21,333 45.3%~ - 2.1%(17.1%)a (27.0%) (26.3%)
With Public Assistance 5,307 12,065 11,614 127.3%
- 3.7%
. (6.0%) (14.9%) (14.3%)
FAMILY
Median Family Income $ 9,310 $16,108 $23,165 73.0% 43.8%
Mean Family Income $10,285 $18,354 $26,994 78.5% 47.1%
Number of Families 65,843 55,832 56,499 -15.2% 1. 2%
Below Poverty Level 6,789 10,535 10,285 55.2%
- 2.4%(10.3%) (18.9%) (18.2%)
aFigures in brackets are percentages.
through federal aid increased. In 1970, twenty-three per-
cent of all households in the city received aid; by 1980,
that percentage had soared to 42 percent. Between 1970 and
1980, the median and mean family income rose by 73 percent
and 78.5 percent, respectively, but so did the number of
families below the poverty level. Household and family
incomes continued to rise throughout the 1980s, with a very
slight decrease in the number of households receiving aid
and the number of families below the poverty level evident
by 1987 . Although income rose in relative terms, the city 's
low income population increased. This disparity suggests
that the poor are not benefitting from recent economic
revitalization.
Housing Stock
As in many other older cities, the housing stock in
Jersey City is old. Of 92,789 housing units built by
December 1986, 83 ,954, or 90 percent, were built prior to
1970. The units built by decade is shown in Table 20 .
The housing situation in Jersey City is also distin-
guished by a high percentage of renter-occupied units .
Owner-occupied units constitute about 28 percent of those
occupied. The figures presented in Table 21 demonstrate
that between 1970 and 1985, 3,900 housing units were lost, a
4.2 percent decrease. Estimates for 1987 show that the
total housing units have increased by 2.5 percent, the first
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TABLE 20
HOUSING UNITS BY YEAR STRUCTURE WAS BUILT
JERSEY CITY
UNITS BUILT TOTAL PERCENT OF TOTAL
UNITS BUILT
April 1985 - 1986 2,242 2.4%
1980 - MARCH 1985 2,916 3.1%
1970 - 1979 3,677 4.0%
1960 - 1969 7,147 7.7%
1950 - 1959 9 ,351 10 .1%
1940 - 1949 13 ,804 14.9%
1939 OR EARLIER 53 ,652 57 .8%
Source: Jersey City Profile, Urban Research & Design
Division , Department of Housing and Economic Development,
Jersey City, NJ, Revised November 16, 1987 .
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TABLE 21
OWNER- AND RENTER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS
JERSEY CITY, 1970-1987
1970 1980 1985 1987
Total Housing 91,956 87,948 88 ,056 90,298
Units
Occupied Units 87,853 80,720 80 .792 82.171
Owner- 24,697 22.610 23,072 23 .501
occupied (28 .1%)a (28%) (28 .6%) (28 .6%)
Renter- 63,156 58,110 57.720 58,670
occupied (71. 8%) (.71.9%) (71. 4%) (71. 3%)
apigures in parentheses represent percentages.
Source: Jersey City Profile. Urban Research & Design
Division, Department ' of Housing and Economic Development,
Jersey City, NJ, Revised November 16. 1987.
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increase since 1970. The number of owner-occupied units
decreased between 1970 and 1980 (8."4 percent) but began to
rise again by 1985. This trend appears to be continuing.
The number of renter-occupied units decreased 8 .6 per-
cent until 1985, representing a loss of 5,436 units. Be-
tween 1985 and 1987, 950 more units were renter-occupied.
This is also the first increase since 1970. Table 22 illus-
trates that owner-occupancy rates in Jersey City are far
lower than the State average. While Jersey City occupancy
rates are similar to those for Hudson County, rates for both
the city and county deviate substantially from the State
average.
Figures for the individual city wards also reflect city-
wide trends; however, the variations are stricking (Tables
23 and 24) . Journal Square is the only ward where renter-
occupied housing increased between 1970 and 1980. There was
more renter-occupied housing in Journal Square in 1985 than
in 1970, a characteristic none of the other wards exhibited.
Owner-occupied housing declined in every ward between 1970
and 1980 , with substantial declines in Journal Square ,
Downtown, and Bergen. By 1985, the number of owner-occupied
housing continued to decline in Greenville and Bergen, while
the other wards, in particular, Downtown, showed increases
in owner-occupied housing. The Heights is unique in having
more owner-occupied housing units in 1985 than in 1970.
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TABLE 22
PERCENTAGES OF OWNER- AND RENTER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS
FOR JERSEY CITY, HUDSON COUNTY, AND NEW JERSEY,
New Jerseya
Hudson
Countya
Jersey Cityb
Waterfront C
1970-1987
OWNER-OCCUPIED RENTER-OCCUPIED
1970 61 .0% 39.0%
1980 62.0% 38 .0%
1970 29.0% 71.0%
1980 30.0% 70.0%
1970 28 .1% 71.8%
1980 28.0% 71.9%
1985 28 .6% 71. 4%
1987 28.6% 71. 3%
1980 17.0% 83.0%
1985 19 .0% 81 .0%
aQbtained from 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census of Population.
bObtained froID Jersey City Profile, Urban Research & Design
Division, Department of Housing and Economic Development,
Jersey City, NJ, Revised November 16, 1987 .
CObtained froID On the Waterfront. March 1987. Ward E,
Downtown , is referred to as the waterfront .
89
TABLE 23
RENTER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS BY WARD
JERSEY CITY , 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
Jersey City 63 ,156 58,110 57 ,720 - 8 .0% - 0 .7%
(71 .9%)a (72.0%) (71. 4%)
Greenville 7,399 7,263 7,123 - 1.8% - 1.9%
(11. 7%) (12.5%) (12.3%)
Westside 10 ,730 9,524 9,930 -11.2% 4.3%
(17 .0%) (16.4%) (17 .2%)
Journal 12,745 13,181 12,794 3.4% - 2.9%
Square (20 .2%) (22 .7%) (22 .2%)
Heights 9 ,313 9,052 9,209 - 2.8% 1. 7%
(14 .7%) (15.6%) (16.0%)
Downtown 12 ,598 10,649 10,404 -15.5% - 2.3%
(19 .9%) (18.3%) (18.0%)
Bergen 10 ,371 8,441 8 ,260 -18.6% - 2.1%
(16 .4%) (14.5%) (14.3%)
apigures in parentheses represent percentages.
Source: Jersey City Profile, Urban Research & Design
Division, Department of Housing and Economic Development,
Jersey City, NJ , Revised November 16, 1987.
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TABLE 24
OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS BY WARD
JERSEY CITY, 1970-1985
1970 1980 1985 PERCENT CHANGE
1970-1980 1980-1985
Jersey City 24,697 22,608 23,072 - 8.5% 2.1%
(28 .1%)a (28 .0%) (28 .6%)
Greenville 4,897 4,755 4,709 - 2.9% - 1.0%
(19.8%) (21.0%) (20.4%)
Westside 4,250 4,000 4,054 - 5.9% 1.4%
(17.2%) (17.7%) (17.6%)
Journal 3,721 3,090 3,214 -17 .0% 4 .0%
Square (15.1%) (13.7%) (13 .9%)
Heights 4,930 4,794 4,990 - 2 .8% 4.1%
(20.0%) (21.2%) (21. 6%)
Downtown 2,576 2,198 2,531 -14.7% 15.2%
(10.4%) (9.7%) (11.0%)
Bergen 4,323 3,771 3 ,574 -12.8% - 5.2%
(17.5%) (16.7%) (15.5%)
apigures in parentheses represent percentages.
Source : Jersey City Profile , Urban Research & Design
Division, Department of Housing and Economic Development,
Jersey City, NJ, Revised November 16, 1987.
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Certain wards, such as Downtown and Journal Square, had
considerably more renter-occupied housing than the rest of
the city. Approximately 75 percent of the housing in
Journal Square was renter-occupied between 1970 and 1985.
Downtown, which was 77 percent renter~occupied in 1970, had
declined slightly by 1985. Downtown had the lowest percen-
tage of owner-occupied housing units throughout 1970 and
1985, but exhibited the largest change in owner-occupied
housing in recent years. Between 1980 and 1985, Downtown
gained more owner-occupied units than any other ward (a 15 .2
percent increase). Between 1980 and 1985, the other city
wards either lost owner-occupied housing, or only gained a
few percent . Greenville and Bergen lost both renter- and
owner-occupied housing. Westside and the Heights gained
some of their housing units. Downtown continued to lose
renter-occupied units and gain owner-occupied units.
Between 1970 and 1980. Journal Square is unique in gaining
renter-occupied units and losing owner-occupied units. This
trend had reversed by 1985.
Clay (1980) notes that areas with a high rate of
renter-occupancy are often subject to gentrification .
Renter households, regardless of ethnic background , are
often adversely affected by gentrification. The median
income of owner-occupants in 1980 was almost twice as high
as the income of renter-occupant households, $20,779 to
$10,445. Also, 30.4 percent of all renter households were
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paying 35 percent or more of their income for rent. Between
1970 and 1980, median rent increased from $92 to $176, a
91.3 percent increase. Rent increased to $282 by 1985 and
continued to rise through 1987 to $332 (Housing Element and
Fair Share Plan, 1987). Thus , in the space of five years,
median rent increased 60 percent, and between 1985 and 1987,
it increased another 17.7 percent, an increase of 88.6 per-
cent between 1980 and 1987. Median income of households,
however, increased by only 68.9 percent between 1970 and
1980, and by only 41 .4 percent between 1980 and 1987. Obvi-
ously, incomes in the city are not increasing as fast as
housing costs . This is one indication of the shrinking
affordable housing market.
The loss of affordable housing from deterioration,
blight, exlusionary, and /or non-residential redevelopment,
gentrification, and condominium conversions is critical.
Condominium conversions have accelerated in recent years , as
Table 25 illustrates. During the past 10 years, 14,010
conversions occurred, with 60 percent occurring in 1988
alone. In 1986, out of 2,049 condominium conversions, only
415 (20 percent) were newly constructed (Housing Element and
Fair Share Plan, 1987).
A final indicator of the perceived value of property in
the city is illustrated by the median value of owner-
occupied (non-condominium) units. In 1970, owner-occupied
units in New Jersey were valued at $23,400 compared to
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TABLE 25
CONDOMINIUM REGISTRATIONS
JERSEY CITY, 1979-1986
YEAR CONDOMINIUM REGISTRATIONS
No. Percent
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987a
1988a
TOTAL
o
86
o
231
136
i52
925
2,049
2,049
8,382
14,010
0.6%
1.6%
1. 0%
1. 0%
6.6%
15.0%
15.0%
60.0%
100.0%b
aAlbright (1988).
bNumbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, 1987.
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$16,400 in Jersey City. By 1980, owner-occupied units in
the State were valued at $61,400; in Jersey City, units were
a mere $30,600. Jersey City values were not only below the
state average, but below Hudson County values as well (the
median value of owner-occupied units in Hudson County in
1980 were $41,987). Units in the Waterfront area of Jersey
City were extremely low - only $29,700. By 1985, the median
value of owner-occupied units in Jersey City increased to
$57,900, an 89.2 percent increase in just five years. The
units in the Waterfront area were valued at $105,250, an
astonishing 2,544 percent increase (On the Waterfront. March
1987) .
CONCLUSION
This analysis and review has served to demonstrate the
rather dismal decline of Jersey City in the post World War
II period. Conditions were particularly bleak between 1970
and 1980. While Jersey City never received the unflattering
sobriquet of "Calcutta of the East," as did Hoboken (Jersey
City's northern neighbor), conditions in Jersey City were
not very different. Most statistical indicators show slight
improvements by 1985, which appear to be continuing through
1987, signalling a positive change in Jersey City. Property
values have increased, and condominium conversions are
numerous. It is no coincidence that Jersey City began to
take advantage of its location along the Hudson River and
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use waterfront development to revitalize the city. Chapter
Four explains the developments proposed for the waterfront,
as well as some of the benefits and problems such
development is expected to bring.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE
1The 1985 Test Census is not as complete as the
decennial census and may seriously underestimate the
low-income and minority populations.
20fficial state estimates for Jersey City differed
considerably and indicated that the population in Jersey
City was declining. not increasing . The state estimates are
obtained from the individual counties and are usually rough
figures that are updated and corrected annually.
3As defined by the U.S. Census.
4As of 1980, the U.S. Census of Population lists 16
separate industries - Agriculture; Forestry and Fisheries;
Mining; Construction; Manufacturing (Durable Goods);
Manufacturing (Nondurable Goods); Transporatation,
Communications and Other Public Utilities; Wholesale Trade;
Retail Trade; Banking and Credit Agencies; Insurance, Real
Estate, and Other Finance; Business and Repair Services;
Other Personal Services; Entertainment and Recreation
Services; Professional and Related Services; and Public
Administration. The 1970 U.S. Census listed 29 categories.
The analysis here conforms to the format used by the Urban
Research & Design Division (formerly the Office of
Planning), Department of Housing and Economic Development.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WATERFRONT REVITALIZATION PROJECTS IN JERSEY CITY
INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in Chapter Two , numerous master plans for
Jersey City incorporated waterfront redevelopment. A tri-
state planning effort was attempted by the Regional Plan
Association in 1966. By the 1970s , regional , state, and
local plans to revitalize the Jersey City waterfront had
been created, if not implemented.
Interest in readapting and revitalizing waterfront
sparked new developments elsewhere . To name a few, plans
for the Boston Harbor and Spokane River were created by the
early 1960s. San Francisco's Ghirardelli Square opened in
1964 . In the 1970s urban renewal funds had helped to create
Baltimore 's Inner Harbor, and Long Wharf and Goat Island
projects in Newport, RI. Federal interest in waterfronts
was also evinced when one panel of the 1965 White House
Conference on Natural Beauty was devoted to water and water-
fronts (Cowey and Rigby, 1979). In 1978, the Federal gov-
ernment began a study of urban recreation needs along the
waterfront (Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service,
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1979) . The following year NOAA (1980) recognized that
opportunities existed for recreational, residential , and
light commercial uses (NOAA , 1980) . Waterfronts also cap-
tured the imagination of city residents who had been disen-
chanted with the formerly derelict, crime-ridden areas.
Citizens seized the opportunity to reclaim the waterfront
for the people and contribute to its development and future
(Manogue, 1980). Wrenn (1983) also notes a general renewed
interest in city living due to improvements in environmental
quality, the changing role of the waterfront, the concept of
creative re-use of historic buildings, and more leisure
time. This renewed interest is demonstrated by Goldstein
and Rowan (1981) who describe grassroot organizations work-
ing with municipal governments to improve urban waterfronts.
By 1984, the Federal government lauded the efforts of
private /public partnerships in revitalizing communities
(Workin~ Partners 1984, April 1984).
Cowey and Rigby (1979) examined some of the reasons for
the slow-building, but explosive interest in urban water-
fronts. Water quality around the country had begun to im-
prove due to the 1965 Water Quality Act and its sUbsequent
amendments and program implementation. Until recently, tax
incentives were available to rehabilitate older buildings.
A back to the city movement 1 may have occurred, helping to
lure people back to the waterfronts, which are often in, or
close to the central business district. President Carter's
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urban policies urged planners and developers to examine the
potential of urban land (including waterfront lands) in
light of neighborhood preservation, and urban recreation,
and the Maritime Heritage Preservation Program helped focus
attention to the waterfront 's unique features.
As interest, both national and local,2 has continued to
grow in waterfronts, the length of time and enormous costs
of producing and developing a waterfront revitalization
project has become proverbial. Fifteen years elapsed before
Boston's Faneuil Hall-Quincy Market was completely restored
and opened to the public. The revitalization of Baltimore's
Harborplace also spanned two decades.
Developers, planners, and governmental officials soon
discovered that waterfront revitalization projects were
difficult and frustrating, at best, to plan, coordinate. and
initiate. The full range of potential problems concerning
waterfront developments is too extensive to explore here3;
however, at the very least, communities and developers must
grapple with environmental, legal, and physical constraints
of the proposed site, eXisting boundaries. access issues,
eXisting uses, confused ownership of waterfront parcels,
financing. community participation in the decision-making
process, and fragmented and overlapping jurisdiction by
local, state, and Federal laws and agencies.
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The huge amounts of capital required to finance water-
front developments has often been acquired in truly creative
ways. Private /public partnerships, which can combine gov-
ernmental incentives, Federal and state loans, and private
financing, sometimes involved dozens of partners (NOAA 1980 ;
Wrenn, 1983). Financing techniques included loan pools,
bond issues, local development corporations, federal, state,
and /or local tax credits , and job training (Workin~ Partners
1984, April 1984). Solutions to streamline overlapping gov-
ernmental jurisdiction, which can include any number of
separate entities, proved less simple. A waterfront project
may be subject to the jurisdiction of Federal agencies such
as the Army Corps of Engineers , the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and /or the National
Marine Fisheries Service, to name a few. Waterfront devel-
opments may be sUbject to provisions under environmental
legislation such as the Coastal Zone Management Act, the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act , Section 103 of the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, the Fish and Wildlife Coordin-
ation Act , the National Environmental Policy Act, the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act, the National Flood Insurance Act, the Endangered
Species Act, and /or the National Historic Preservation Act,
among others. Superimposed upon this plethora of Federal
legislative programs are state, county. and local regula-
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tions, ordinances, and policies, all of which can create
redundancy, prolonged review, and delayed projects' (Marsh et
al., 1987; Wrenn 1982 , 1983).
WATERFRONT REVITALIZATION IN NEW JERSEY
In an effort to promote waterfront revitalization, New
Jersey governor Thomas Kean created the Waterfront Develop-
ment Office and Waterfront Development Committee in 1983.
The objective of the office is to act as a liaison between
local and state officials, citizens, and developers. The
office and committee coordinate the activities of the vari-
ous state agencies responsible for permits and approvals,
and conduct studies of issues related to the waterfront.
The state envisions a dynamic future for the Hudson River
waterfront, which includes 30 million square feet of office
space , 3 million square feet of retail space, 30,000 housing
units (mostly condominiums and apartments), 3 ,500 hotel
rooms , and docking space for 5,000 boats. Waterfron~ revi-
talization is expected to create 62 ,000 jobs , and the water-
front is expected to be home to 45,000 residents (New Jersey
Hudson River Waterfront Rediscovery and Renewal, 1988).
Although the waterfront revitalization experience in
Jersey City resembles that of other communities, no other
area can match Jersey City for its sheer number of projects.
No less than thirty-seven proposals have been made for the
"Gold Coast" of New Jersey, an area stretching from Fort Lee
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to Bayonne. The "Gold Coast" refers to 12 municipalities
along the Hudson River - Fort Lee, Cliffside Park, Edge-
water, North Bergen, Guttenberg, West New York, Union City,
Weehawken, Secaucus, Hoboken, Jersey City, and Bayonne. In
1988 , 17 of the proposed projects were located in Jersey
City , followed by Edgewater (10), Hoboken (6), Weehawken
(1), North Bergen (1), and one project in Weehawken and West
New York, and one project in West New York and Guttenberg .
This proposed development would occupy 2,488 acres of water-
front property and create 36,030 housing units, 35,159
square feet of office space, 4,157 square feet of retail
space , 4,000 hotel rooms, 5,843 boat slips, and 54,735 park-
ing spaces. Almost half of this development would take
place in Jersey City (On the Waterfront. Spring 1988).
WATERFRONT REVITALIZATION IN JERSEY CITY
As of May 1988, 30 projects are planned for Ward E of
Jersey City, known as Downtown , or the "waterfront."
Projects in this 2 .4 square mile area range from large
mixed-use complexes to small residential redevelopments .
All but eight have received approval or are in the process
of being approved by the city. Four projects (2 small resi-
dential , 2 office) were recently completed. If all the pro-
posals are eventually built, Jersey City will acquire 23,476
,r e s i de nt i al units; 22,064,855 square feet of office space;
2,032,471 square feet of commercial/retail space; 2,200
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hotel rooms; 43,497 parking spaces; arid 1,427 boat Slips.4
(These figures do not include developments in other sections
of the city, nor do they include figures for other munici-
palities along the New Jersey Coast.)
Estimates of the impact of this development on Jersey
City are substantial: population is expected to increase by
27.1 percent, employment by 96.8 percent, housing units by
26.6 percent, office space by 530.4 percent, commercial/
retail space by 81.3 percent, and median family income by
148.3 percent. This translates into a gain of 59,629 addi-
tional residents, 96,389 jobs, 23,476 housing units, and
24,097,326 square feet of office, commercial, and retail
space. Downtown is expected to experience a population
increase of 71.2 percent (24,794 residents) and a housing
unit increase of 56 .3 percent (8,459 units). A change in
racial composition is also anticipated, with the white pop-
lation expected to constitute almost 50 percent of all
Downtown residents. The black and hispanic populations
would each constitute roughly 25 percent of the ward
(Projected Waterfront Development, Division of Urban
Research & Design, 1988). (According to 1985 figures, 40
percent of Downtown was white, 26 percent black, 40 percent
hispanic, and 7 percent asian.)
While these figures suggest massive and impressive
developments, close to a decade passed before the grandoise
dreams and efforts of developers, planners, state and local
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officials, and citizens groups became tangible. Long before
plans for the waterfront became a reality, Jersey City
underwent inner-city revitalization in the form of Federal
aid for low-income housing (e .g., Model Cities Program). A
brownstone revolution occurred in Jersey City between 1973
and 1980 (Jersey Journal Master File), which, in the ter-
minology of the gentrification literature. signalled the
entry of urban pioneers to the city. Also. urban renewal
projects were commonplace in the city in the late 1970s
(Interview Data, 1988). The housing crisis in New York City
in the late 1970s and early 1980s helped to attract people
to the relatively cheaper housing in New Jersey. However,
data presented in Chapter Three demonstrates, that despite
this, conditions in Jersey City did not improve overall
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Although waterfront
revitalization during this period is not responsible for all
redevelopment in Jersey City. it is likely that it acted as
a catalyst for subsequent revitalization. This section
details the history of some of Jersey City 's largest and
best-known waterfront revitalization projects. The location
of these projects appears in Figure 7.
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FIGURE 7
DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AREA MAP
(in back pocket)
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Newport
Newport, the largest waterfront development in Jersey
City, occupies 400 acres near the Hoboken boundary. In
1977, the Planning Board determined that the Northern
Waterfront Redevelopment Area (which was later called the
Newport City Development Project Area) qualified as
blighted under N.J.S. 40:55-21 et. se~. The Planning Board
determined that the manufacturing bUildings on the site were
abandoned and in poor condition, the vacant land had been
unimproved and was unlikely to be improved solely through
private investment, and the area was generally stagnant,
unproductive, and not used in any manner that served the
health, safety, and welfare of the people. The site was
occupied by 21 families, 12 individuals, and 49 businesses
employing 500 people , most of whom were later relocated
pursuent to Federal and state regulations (Newport City
Development Project, DEIS , 1983).
In 1980 the City Council approved the redevelopment
plan for the project, which went through a series of name
changes. Originally the project was called Harborside, then
Harbor City. This was changed to Newport City, and due to
the urging of Mayor Cucci in 1986 , the project became known
as Newport (Newport City Development Project, DEIS, 1983;
New York Times, September 7, 1986) . Newport is a joint
venture by The Lefrak Organization, Inc. (a New York
developer), Melvin Simon & Associates, Inc. (one of the
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nation's largest mall developers) and the Glimcher Company
(a shopping center developer based in Colombus, Ohio). The
development has the distinction of receiving a $40 million
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG), one of the largest
ever granted. The grant was used for acquiring lands,
demolishing existing buildings, relocating site occupants,
and constructing necessary infrastructure and related
development activities (Newport City Development Project,
DEIS, 1983). In addition, the project was further
subsidized by approximately $210 million in state and
Federal loans (Leith, 1988).
Ten years of construction and $10 billion are expected
to transform 600 acres into 10 million square feet of office
space, 3 hotels, a convention and conference center, 9,000
residential units, a 1 .2 million square foot shopping mall,
museums, theatres, a marina and yacht club , and parks
(DeRogatis, May 5-May 12, 1988; Newport Promotional Materi-
al ; and Leon, 1987). Billed as an "incredible community"
and "a prototype for the 21st century," Newport is expected
to attract 35,000 residents and pay $1.2 million in taxes
annually by 1993 (DeRogatis, May 5-May 12, 1988; Strehl,
1987). Furthermore, Jersey City will receive 25 percent of
the profits from Newport Centre and the four apartment
towers in Phase I (DeRogatis, May 3 , 1988) .
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The Newport saga spanned the careers of two city mayors
and involved an acrimonious, protracted two-year battle be-
tween New York and New Jersey over the $40 million UDAG
grant. Before the grant was approved by the Federal govern-
ment, the mayors of Jersey City and New York City, as well
as the senators and governors of New Jersey and New York,
had been drawn into a debate over whether the Jersey City
development would lure businesses and jobs away from New
York City. Finally, New York withdrew its opposition after
promises that Jersey City would not use the money to attract
New York City businesses. Jersey City Mayor McCann also
agreed not to accept New York City commercial tenants for
the first phase of Newport (New York Times. April 13, 1984;
New York Times. April 22, 1984). The project was further
delayed until a plan could be created" to treat the sewage
that would emanate from the site, and an alleged mob-related
strike stymied construction in 1985 (Leith, 1988). Hydro-
carbon contamination discovered by the Health Department in
1988 has raised fears of possible groundwater contamination,
and allegations of intentional contamination by Newport
(Stapinski, 1988).
By November 1987, visible progress was made. The
three-level, $100 million Newport Centre regional shopping
mall officially opened. Not only does the mall provide
much-needed retail services, but the complex is expected to
produce more than $200 million in annual revenues and pay
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$1.2 million in taxes (Strehl, 1987). Tenants began moving
into the four rental towers and two condominium towers in
1987, and one 14-story office bUilding has been leased
(DeRogatis, May 5-May 12, 1988; Collier , 1988).
Port Liberte
Port Liberte is perhaps the most exclusive and cosmo-
politan of Jersey City's waterfront developments. The proj-
ect is located on 114 acres of land just south of Liberty
State Park at Caven Point, an old army railroad depot.
Planning started as early as 1980 (DePalma, 1985), although
the Jersey City Redevelopment Agency did not accept the plan
until 1984 (Warman, 1986) . By 1994, Port Liberte will be a
$750 million waterfront community of 1,700 housing units,
110,000 square feet of commercial space , a 240-room hotel
and marina surrounded by 2.5 miles of salt-water canals.
The complex will also feature townhouses, apartments, a
yacht club, a tennis and health club , restaurants, shops, an
office complex, and a sanctuary for wildlife (DeRogatis, May
5-May 12, 1988; Warman, 1986). Costs of the units will
range from $226,500 to $798,500 (Port Liberte promotional
material), and the more expensive units will have private
docking facilities.
Port Liberte is one of the few waterfront projects not
located in Downtown. The area's closest residential neigh-
bors are in Bergen-Lafayette and Greenville. The develop-
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complete with two piers on each end, was intended to consol-
idate the railroads and enable them to compete effectively
with the trucking industry. Almost all rail and shipping
trade was supposed to flow through the $50 million terminal,
which also featured its own police force, fire department,
hospital, power house, storage. manufacturing, and office
space, and shopping center . The terminal was expected to
make Jersey City a "commercial tyre," a fate that seemed
assured when the American Steamship Company and Scantic
Passenger Lines moved many of their operations to Jersey
City in 1930 (Brooks, 1983 ; Harborside Financial Center
Master Plan , 1987) .
The terminal slowly declined throughout the next few
decades. The Pennsylvania Dock and Warehouse Company relin-
quished control of the facility to Harborside Warehouse Com-
pany in 1933 for unspecified reasons. Parts of the terminal
were occupied by the U.S. Army during World War II . A
. strike occurred in 1945, followed by a tax lien against the
terminal in 1975, and more strikes in 1978 and 1980 (Brooks ,
1983; Harborside Financial Center Master Plan, 1987).
The decline of the terminal represented, in minature,
the larger decline of the manufacturing and industrial sec-
tor in the U.S. By 1981, however, the Harborside Develop-
ment Company began plans to purchase the terminal . A master
plan to renovate the waterhouse and its two piers was
initiated . The next year, Michael Sonnenfeld and David
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the shoreline (DePalma, 1985). Part of Port Liberte's
success in this area could be attributed to the hiring of a
former assistant director of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service as environmental consultant (Ayenue, May 1987).
By 1988, the first phase of the project was well
underway. Most of the canals had been started, and of the
363 residential units completed, 290 have been sold (Shaman,
1988) . Approximately 150 people reside in Port Liberte. A
ferry to New York City has also been added (DeRogatis, May
5-May 12, 1988; Interview Data, 1988).
Harborside Financial Center
Harborside Terminal, originally known as the Pennsyl-
vania Dock and Warehouse Company, was built between 1930 and
1931-. The terminal is located across from Manhattan's World
Trade Center and is bordered by railroad tracks and the PATH
station. The Pennslyvania Railroad Terminal once stood next
to the Harborside Terminal before the railroad terminal was
demolished in 1951 . Four historic districts - Paulus Hook,
Van Vorst Park , Hamilton Park, and Harsimus Cove - surround
the terminal.
The terminal, which was used as a warehouse, freight-
ing, manufacturing, and docking facility for 40 years, was
initiated in 1928 by Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague, the
president of the Jersey City Board of Trade, and the
Pennsylvania Railroad. The gigantic "rail to keel" complex,
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ment is rather isolated due to boundaries imposed by the New
Jersey Turnpike extension, two railroads, a cemetary, and a
park. Init ially the site was composed of predominately
industrial, vacant land. Due to distance and physical
barriers, Port Liberte was considered unlikely to have any
significant impacts on the surrounding communities (EA for
Port Liberte Project, 1987) .
The development is notable for its international team
of developers and investors . French designer Francois
Spoerry, Swiss property developer Pierre Barrier Labouchere,
Prince Ferdinand von- Bismarck, and New York developer Paul
Bucha hope to create an unparalleled architectural marvel.
The project is financed by American investors (Wicks,
1986).
Port Liberte is also unique in that it acquired the
necessary waterfront development permits from the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection quickly. The first
permit was granted by 1985, and by 1987 all the Federal,
state , and local waterfront development permits and zoning
approvals were granted for the project (DePalma, 1985;
Scanlon, 1987), an amazing achievement considering the usual
length of time necessary to acquire environmental permits.
The project also consisted of some sensitive environmental
alterations, namely a a series of canals dug into the site
(the site was created 40 years ago through landfilling by
the U.S. Army), and concerns over the natural character of
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Fromer purchased the terminal for $26 million, even though
$1.1 million was owed in back taxes (PSEG publication, 1988;
Harborside Financial Center Master Plan, 1987). After some
renovation occurred, US West purchased the project for about
$125 million, with Jones Lang Wootton as developer and agent
(PSEG Publication, 1988).
A new mixed-use development was planned on the site of
the former warehouse /terminal. The $900 million, 7 million
square foot, Harborside Financial Center covers 48.4 acres
(including water). The center is planned as a complete
community with office, retail, parking, residential, and
recreational facilities (Harborside Financial Center Master
Plan, 1987) . The development will comprise six plazas, with
twin 50-story towers, a marina, a 316-room hotel, and a two-
story pier condominium (The Record. June 5, 1987; DeRogatis,
May 5-May 12 , 1988). In addition, a retail arcade, a
promenade, atriums, paths, and parks are planned (Harborside
Financial Center Master Plan, 1987).
In ten years, Harborside is expected to employ 24,000
people and yield a net tax surplus totalling $13.4 million
to the city (DeRogatis, December 2 , 1987; Harborside Finan-
cial Center Master Plan, 1987). Currently , a third of the
first phase of development is complete. The renovated Plaza
I had already been leased to Bankers Trust Corporation
(DeRogatis, May 5-May 12, 1988) . More than 50 companies
currently lease space in Plazas II and III (PSEG pUblica-
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tion, 1988), and Plaza II is almost completely leased
(Harborside Financial Center Tenant Newsletter, Spring
1988).
Like Newport, Harborside had to face certain obstacles.
A repeat of the New York-New Jersey feud over UDAG approval
flared up in 1985. Finally, in 1986, the $9 million Federal
grant was denied on the grounds that Jersey City had failed
to show that the project would not take jobs from New York
City. This may have been the first time a grant was ever
denied for that reason (New York Times. June 10, 1986).
Despite this, Harborside continued with its plans.
The Jersey City City Council and Planning Board were
extremely enthusiastic over the proposal and approved
Harborside's master plan six months after the plan was
officially presented (DeRogatis, December 2, 1987; The
Record. June 5, 1987). Harborside was the first to present
the city with a completed master plan, unlike Newport and
Port Liberte, which usually request site approval for small
sections of the project at a time (DeRogatis, December 2,
1987).
Other projects in the Exchange Place area were also
completed. The 300,000 square foot, 17-story Evertrust
Office Tower opened with 90 percent of its space occupied
(PSEG Publication, 1988). Also, six floors of a 30-story
office tower, Exchange Plaza Center, developed by First
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Jersey National Corporation and William D. Schaffel, are
occupied by First Jersey National Bank (DeRogatis, May 5-May
12, 1988).
Harsimus Cove South
Not every waterfront development in the city has pro-
gressed as smoothly as Newport , Port Liberte, and Harbor-
side. In 1986. the city approved a $140 million, 95-acre
development to be constructed at Harsimus Cove, which is
located between Newport and the Harborside Financial Center .
The property, owned by National Bulk Carriers, will feature
low, mid, and highrise condominium units , restaurants, and a
marina. Permits have still not been approved by the
Department of Environmental Protection (DeRogatis, May 5-May
12, 1988).
Colgate-Palmolive
The Colgate-Palmolive Co., established in Jersey City
over 168 years ago , is located south of Harborside Financial
Center and Exchange Place . The company began to relocate
its liquid soap and other manufacturing operations elsehwere
and to demolish portions of its factory in 1988. Plans were
submitted in December 1987 to build a $2 billion waterfront
development consisting of 1,500 residential units, a hotel ,
marina, retail shopping , and six office buildings
(DeRogatis , March 31-April 7, 1988) . The project is expect-
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ed to be completed in 15 years and provide 25,000 jobs and
$45 million in taxes to the state and city (A Plan for
Changing Times, promotional literature, no date).
Aspects of the project were criticized by the Historic
Paulus Hook Association in April 1988. The Association was
concerned over proposed density and height of buildings, and
the lack of plans to preserve and rehabilitate scenic
buildings (DeRogatis, March 31-April 7, 1988). In June
1988, the Planning Board approved site plans for a 40-story,
1,167,000 square foot office tower (Morgan, 1988).
CONCLUSION
Until the proposed projects are complete, the true
glamour and magnitude of the Jersey City Waterfront is
difficult to imagine. The major downtown projects directly
along the waterfront - Newport, Harsimus Cove South,
Harborside Financial Center, Exchange Place Plaza, and
Colgate-Palmolive - epitomize comtemporary waterfront ~esign
and planning. Both Harborside and Port Liberte received
awards for superior site design and planning concepts from
the New Jersey Chapter of the American Planning Association
(Harborside Financial Center Tenant Newsletter, 1988). How-
ever, this is only part of the intense revitalization occur-
ring throughout the city and the region. More than half of
the city's 42 redevelopment plans are located in Downtown
(Current Redevelopment and Zoning Districts , Jersey City
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Division of Urban Research & Design, August 1986). While it
is unlikely that projects comparable to the waterfront
developments will appear elsewhere in the city, numerous,
smaller renovation and revitalization projects continue to
be proposed and implemented . Furthermore, other large,
comprehensive waterfront projects are progressing in
Weehawken (Lincoln Harbor) and North Bergen (Roc Harbor)
(DeRogatis, May 5-May 12, 1988).
Although waterfront revitalization is expected to con-
tinue until approximately 1994, some of the largest develop-
ments are well on their way toward completion. Furthermore,
these developments are beginning to impact the city, and
numerous problems are appearing. Chapter Five discusses and
elaborates on the hypothesis and methodology used to address
these issues. Chapter .Six details the results of the
investigation and waterfront revitalization.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR
I The existence of a "Back to the City Movement" is a
major debate in the literature concerning urban
revitalization, gentrification, and neighborhood renewal.
This movement has not been supported in studies by Abravanel
and Mancini (1980), Holcomb and Beauregard (1981), or Palen
and London (1984) . At best, it may represent a social
movement with its own mythology (Allen, 1984; Laska and
Spain, 1984; and Smith, 1986). Although researchers
disagree, the general consensus appears to be that while
some inner city areas have gentrified, cities on the whole
have lost population.
2The Waterfront Center in Washington D.C. publishes
Waterfront World. one of the few periodicals that concerns
national and international waterfront development. Among
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other features, the publication presents capsules of
waterfront revitalization projects. The developments along
New Jersey's "Gold Coast" became so numerous that the
publication began to cover only one project per issue.
3For detailed information see Marsh et al. (1987) and
Wrenn (1983), Chapter 4.
4Every attempt was made to acquire the most recent an
accurate figures; however, at times sources varied
considerably. Projections for developments change rapidly
due to constant negoitiations and compromises between
developers, city officials, and citizen groups.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
HYPOTHESES
It is hypothesized that decisions made by officials and
administrators in Jersey City, N.J . are directly affected by
the public's negative perceptions of gentrification.
Specifically, it is hypothesized that negative perceptions
will create policies to control or mitigate gentrification.
It is further hypothesized that attitudes concerning the
negative effects of gentrification affect the morphology and
structure of coastal developments by creating more stringent
design guidelines and incorporating social policies.
Several assumptions underlie the hypothesis. It is
assumed that some level of gentrification exists in Jersey
City due to a previous brownstone renovation (Jersey Journal
Master File), mammoth 'wat e r f r ont revitalization projects.
and the controversy surrounding the mayoral election in
November 1984. Nonwithstanding the methodological and
definitional difficulties involved. it is assumed that gen-
trification could be documented and measured . A gentrifica-
tion project is currently underway by the Department of
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Housing and Economic Development in Jersey City (Spooner,
1988) . The city has already issued and/or commissioned
reports suggesting that gentrification does exist, although
it is rarely quantified (Housing Element and Fair Share
Plan, 1987; Jersey City Anti-displacement Strategy, April
26, 1981; and Rick Cohen & Associates, 1981, 1982).
It is assumed that the public and their representa-
tives (i.e., city officials) believe gentrification exists.
Whether it can be documented, or even actually exists, is
secondary. The public and their representatives will make
decisions based on what they believe to be true, sometimes
referred to as "administrative behavior" (March and Simon,
1958; Simon 1957). If public officials represent the con-
cerns of their constituency, and both the pUblic and their
representative believe gentrification eXists, it follows
that this perception may be evident in city policies and
ordinances . Policies concerning waterfront revitalization
are therefore expected to reflect the perception that gen-
trification is occurring, and depending on the government's
perception of gentrification, policies will either encourage
or discourage gentrification.
In the case of Jersey City, the Cucci campaign was con-
cerned over the negative effects of gentrification and dis-
placement and stressed balanced development and affordable
housing. It is assumed that gentrification was perceived as
a danger by both the public and the incoming administration.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that city policies of the
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current administration would therefore be aimed at (1) re-
ducing or halting the level of gentrification, and (2) cre-
ating more stringent guidelines for waterfront revitaliza-
tion.
City policies result from complex interactions and
negotiations between municipal decision makers, Federal,
State, and county interests, the public, and special
interest groups. Figure 8 identifies the possible actors in
the decision-making process for waterfront revitalization
policies in Jersey City. The strength and success of each
group may vary, depending on economic, social, and
historical circumstances. Members of one group may be
involved in other groups. Linkages between groups were not
identified or defined.
The emphasis in this research was on the policies
created by the city administration based on its perception
of the public's attitude toward gentrification. As a
result, the perceptions of representatives of the city
administration were considered critical to this research.
This study does not fully assess the contributions of other
groups in the decision-making process, although the opinions
of representatives from groups other than those from the
city administration were solicited. The Federal, State, and
county interest in waterfront revitalization policies
related to gentrification was considered less important to
this study because New Jersey has a well-established
tradition of municipal home rule. However, the State and
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county have been instrumental in initiating planning studies
for the waterfront and the problems of municipalities along
the Gold Coast (see Chapter Six, Additional Problems, for
more information). The section that follows describes the
methodology used to conduct this study, and identifies the
special interest groups interviewed in addition to the
representatives of the city administration.
METHOLODOLOY
Data to support the hypotheses was obtained from
detailed personal interviews with city officials/
administrators, citizen participation groups, developers and
media representatives concerned with and/or affected by gen-
trification. The int€rviews were designed to uncover de-
tails concerning the waterfront revitalization experience in
Jersey City, with particu~ar emphasis on the social and eco-
nomic changes that have occurred since 1980. Specific ques-
tions which the survey intended to address included : (1)
how participants believed the public perceives gentrifica-
cation and waterfront revitalization, (2) participants' per-
sonal perception of gentrification and waterfront revitali-
zation, and (3) identification of city policies that have
been implemented concerning gentrification . The hypotheses
were tested quantitatively by using a frequency analysis of
interview responses. To further substantiate the research
objective, information concerning recent policies and issues
involving gentrification and waterfront revitalization was
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compiled from the participants during the interviews and
from city documents. Some of these were identified during
the survey interviews . A full discussion of the results of
this research appears Chapter Six.
Sample Selection
Representatives from four major groups - City
Officials/Administrators (15), Citizen Participation Groups
(6), Waterfront Developers (2), and Media (2) - were inter-
viewed. The City Officials /Administrators was better repre-
sented than the other groups based on the assumption that
these individuals were in a position of authority and could
better control the resources necessary to solve problems.
These individuals are referred to as "power brokers" (Dynes
and Wenger , 1971). It was assumed that the elected
officials and appointed administrators would be best able to
direct city policies. Furthermore, this group was
believed to represent the interests and concerns of the
public.
The initial target group was the City Council, which is
composed of nine elected representatives . Seven members
were interviewed . 1 It was suspected that the City
Council may espouse a single political philosophy since all
but one council member entered office on the Cucci Coalition
ticket in 1985. 2 This pool of participants was expanded
to include professionals in the city administration (e.g.,
planners), a state senator, and city executives (one of
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which was representative of the prior political regime).
These participants were chosen based the recommendation ,of
members of the City Council.
The pool of participants was expanded again to include
10 more individuals. The purpose of this was to obtain a
more comprehensive view of waterfront revitalization. Two
represented the Media and both had witnessed the effects of
the last two city administrations. Two Waterfront Develop-
ers were chosen for their insights, and six individuals from
citizen participation groups were also included. Although
there are numerous citizen participation groups in the city,
most are neighborhood oriented . Attempts to locate a list-
ing of all the groups and contact representatives proved
futile. As a result, only the most active groups were
contacted and three of the individuals interviewed were
members of one of the Downtown historic associations. 3
Results were analyzed by a frequency analysis.
A test of the survey instrument was conducted in March
1988 in Hoboken, N.J. This city, immediately north of
Jersey City, shares many of the same concerns and problems
as Jersey City. Participants included members of the City
Council and City Administrators. The survey instrument was
redesigned slightly based on the results of the test
interviews.
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Procedure
Twenty-five detailed, open-ended interviews were con-
ducted during April and May 1988. The survey instrument
appears in Appendix A. Interviewing sessions ranged from
one to three hours in duration, most often depending on the
schedule of the participant. The purpose of the survey in-
strument was to solicit as much information as possible
concerning the effects of waterfront revitalization on the
city. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions con-
cerning the recent history of Jersey City, waterfront revi-
talization, perceptions of gentrification, attitudes held by
newcomers and long-time residents, city policies, and recent
and past political events. 4 Interviews were tailored to
each major participant groups and then further specialized,
if practical, to each participant.
Not all the participants were asked the same questions,
mainly due to time constraints on the part of the partici-
pants . Also, some questions asked of one group were not
considered applicable to another group. For instance, rep-
resentatives from the citizen participation group were not
asked about city policies concerning gentrification. Cer-
tain City Officials /Administrators were asked specific ques-
tions regarding their responsibilities and accomplishments.
As a consequence, the sample size for any particular ques-
tion may be smaller than the sample size for the group as a
whole.
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Flaws in the Methodolo~y
Questions were designed to give participants the oppor-
tunity to answer as they felt best. No attempt was made to
elicit a particular response . Questions were clarified only
upon the request of the participant. Therefore, it is like-
ly that some participants may not have understood a particu-
lar question, or the question was too vague. Confusion may
have existed over the definitions and differrences between
gentrification and waterfront revitalization.
Some participants raised the issue of confidentiality
of their responses. The purpose of the interviews was ex-
plained to each participant at the start of each session,
and responses are not associated with individual respon-
dents . It is possible, however, that some participants were
still reluctant to respond. Participants were encouraged to
include whatever information they believed pertinent .
Responses were often detailed and informative, but were very
difficult to tabulate and quantify . Unfortunately, at times
detailed explanations of the first few questions were so
time-consuming that final questions were sometimes rushed or
eliminated completely. The results of the interviews appear
in the next chapter.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE
lOne council member was unavailable for an interview;
the other was unable to be reached by telephone.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The glittering facade of massive waterfront revitaliza-
tion projects is evidence of economic, social, and political
change. While developers stress that the perception of
Jersey City as a place of live and work has changed for the
better (Fromer and Sonnenfeldt, 1985; The Record. October
16, 1987, October 7, 1987, October 23, 1987; and New York
Times. October 11, 1987), the public may not completely
agree.
The hypothesis expounded in this research suggests that
attitudes concerning the effects of gentrification along the
urban waterfront influence the morphology and structure of
coastal development. The results of the survey interviews
and analysis of recent policies indicate that perceptions of
gentrification exist and a number of policies and ordinances
relating to gentrification have been promulgated. This
chapter details the data used to support the hypothesis.
First, the results of 25 interviews conducted between April
and May 1988 are presented in this chapter. This is fol-
lowed ~y a brief discussion of recent policies promulgated
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by the Jersey City administration . State housing programs
and activities are mentioned as well. A section is devoted
to some of the additional problems the city is facing.
INTERVIEW RESULTS
Results in this section are preceded by the applicable
question on the survey instrument. The number of partici-
pants who were asked a particular question is indicated.
This is followed by the total number of responses and the
answers given by participants. Participants usually men-
tioned more than one answer. The number and percent of par-
ticipants who gave the same answers are listed. Percentages
do not always equal 100 percent due to rounding. Each table
is numbered for easy reference.
DATA TABLE 1
How would you describe conditions in Jersey City Between
1970 and 1980?
No. of Participants: 13 Total Responses: 40
Participants Giving Same Response
No. Percent
City was very blue-collar 10 25.0%
Middle class fled the city 9 23.0%
No pride in city 5 12.0%
Residents were generally
pDor 4 10.0%
Many blighted areas 2 5 .0%
High crime rate 2 5.0%
Riots 2 5 .0%
City was very ethnic 2 5 .0%
High Catholic Population 1 2.5%
Little private development 1 2 .5%
Remnants of political
2 .5%machine 1
No services available 1 2 .5%
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DATA TABLE 2
How would you describe what is currently happening in Jersey
City?
No. of Participants: 15 Total Responses: 35
Participants Giyin~ Same Response
No. Percent
Promising times 8 23%
New people coming "i n 8 23%
New growth and opportunities 7 20%
Increases in housing prices
and changes in type of
housing 4 11%
Increasing taxes 3 9%
Growing disparity between
rich and poor neighborhoods 2 6%
Less diversity 1 3%
City is taking jobs from
Manhattan 1 3%
Politics is holding up
development 1 3%
DATA TABLE 3
Why has Jersey City sUddenly been "discovered?"
No. of Participants : 17 Total Responses: 28
Participants Givin~ Same Response
No. Percent
Proximity to New York
(responses also included
lower rents in Jersey
City, and ease of trans-
portation)
Pro-development stance of
previous administration
Inducement from Federal /State
government
Aided by development of
Liberty State Park
Politics impeded development
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16
8
2
1
1
57.0%
29 .0%
7.0%
3.5%
3.5%
DATA TABLE 4
Is revitalization having positive and /or negative affects in
Jersey City? In particular, the waterfront area?
No. of Participants: 20 Total Responses: 76
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
POSITIVE
More tax revenues 10 13.0%
Helps stabilize community 7 9.0%
New opportunities 7 9.0%
More jobs 6 8.0%
New people 6 8.0%
Better image of city 6 8.0%
Provides ratables 5 6.5%
Improves infrastructure 3 4.0%
Helps stabilize tax base 2 3.0%
Reduces crime 2 3.0%
NEGATIVE
Causes displacement 11 14.5%
Creates higher property
taxes 5 6.5%
Creates need for more
infrastructure 3 4.0%
Creates competition for
housing units 1 1. 0%
Older businesses can't
compete 1 1.0%
Creates conflicts between
newcomers and long-time
residents 1 1.0%
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DATA TABLE 5
Is revitalization benefitting everyone in the city?
No. of Participants: 11 Total Responses: 21
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
Often excludes working, poor,
and minorities
Not good if it hurts people
Jobs aren't going to city
residents
Benefits are just starting and
will be experienced in the
future
Better planning would help
Developers are showing a social
conscious and will provide
more benefits
4
4
4
4
3
2
19%
19%
19%
19%
14%
10%
DATA TABLE 6
What is the public'S perception of the changes taking place
in Jersey City?
No. of Participants : 13 Total Responses: 25
Participants Giying Same Response
No . Percent
Creates pride in the city
Creates jobs and opportunities
Public doesn't understand what
revitalization will bri~g
Creates displacement
Development isn 't helping be-
cause taxes are still high
The city government is giV-
ing the city to developers
Most people aren't benefitting
from revitalization
Public is noticing benefits
Depends on an individual 's
politics
No affordable housing is
being created
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4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
16%
16%
16%
12%
8%
8%
8%
8%
4%
4%
DATA TABLE 7
How do you believe the general public defines
gentrification?
No. of Partiqipants: 16 Total Responses: 39
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
10 37%
5 19%
5 19%
4 15%
2 7%
1 3%
27 69%
11 28%
Unspecificed
Some people lose out in the
process
Rich taking from poor
May be a result of bad press
Causes displacement
Creates rising property
taxes
Negatively
Depends on who you ask
(different responses would
be given based on how it
affected an individual)
Public is indifferent
DATA TABLE 8
1 3%
Would you describe some of the signs of gentrification?
No. of Participants: 8 Total Responses: 19
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
More landlord abuses
(e.g., lack of services,
terrorizing tenants)
Condo conversions
Increasing property taxes
Increase in "yuppie" services
Roommate matching services
appearing
More interest in cultural
activities
Areas building up
Factory closings
Increasing homelessness
For Sale signs/real estate tours
More sophisticated criminal
activity
Decline in church attendence
Increase in gay population
13.1
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
16.0%
16.0%
11.0%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
5.3%
DATA TABLE 9
Gentrification tends to occur selectively. Which wards are
currently affected by or undergoing gentrification?
No. of Participants: 14 Total Responses: 35
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
Downtown
Heights
Pockets allover the city
Journal Square
Westside
Greenville
Bergen
13
6
5
5
3
2
1
37%
17%
14%
14%
9%
6%
3%
DATA TABLE 10
Why (is gentrification occurring in those areas)?
No. of Participants: 14 Total Responses: 20
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
Transportation
Access to Manhattan
Low rents/speculation from
developers
Existence of Urban Enterprise
Zone
Residential Preference
Good housing stock
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9
5
3
1
1
1
45%
25%
15%
5%
5%
5%
DATA TABLE 11
How would you describe newcomers?
No. of Partici~ants: 20 Total Res~onses: 70
Partici~ants Giying Same Res~onse
No . Percent
"Yuppies"
Different values
More active and politically
sophisticated
Don't care about city, only
about themselves
Less accepting of "business
as usual"
Transitory
Good for city
Diffent lifestyle than long-
time residents
Different economic class
Arrogant
Educated
Transplanted New Yorkers
Don't understand political /
economic /social reality
Real estate speculators
Invaders
Not really that different
than long-time residents
Phony liberals
11
7
6
6
6
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
16.0%
10.0%
8.5%
8.5%
8.5%
7.0%
6 .0%
6.0%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
3.0%
3.0%
1. 5%
1. 5%
DATA TABLE 12
How would you describe long-time residents?
No . of Participants: 12 Total Responses: 24
Partici~ants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
Passive
Suspicious of newcomers
Blame newcomers for problems
Perceive that newcomers have
advantages they never did
Afraid of change
Blue collar types
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8
5
4
3
2
2
33%
21%
17%
13%
8%
8%
DATA TABLE 13
Do tensions between newcomers and long-time residents
exist?
No. of Participants: 16 Total Responses: 16
Participants Giying Same Response
No. Percent
Yes
(e.g., verbal, physical,
racial)
No
13
3
81%
19%
DATA TABLE 14
Do concerns among newcomers and long-time residents differ?
No . of Participants: 9 Total Responses: 9
Participants Giying Same Response
NQ. Percent
Yes
No
7
2
DATA TABLE 15
78%
22%
What steps has the city taken to cQntrQl gentrificatiQn?
NQ. of Participants: 11 Total RespQnses: 20
Participants Giying Same RespQnses
NQ. Percent
Linkage prQgram fQr affQrdable
hQusing 10 50%
Stricter hQusing Qrdinances 5 25%
CreatiQn Qf Office Qf Tenant
Assistance 1 5%
Creation of ECQnomic DevelQP-
ment CQrporation 1 5%
SuppQrting Women and MinQrity-
Qwned businesses 1 5%
Affirmative Action PQlicies 1 5%
Better planning 1 5%
137
DATA TABLE 16
What is the future of Jersey City?
No. of Participants: 9 Total Responses: 26
Participants GiYin~ Same Response
No. Percent
Revitalization will help
all areas 5 19%
Will become an extension of
New York City 4 15%
Politically uncertain 4 15%
More pride in city 3 12%
Better environment 2 8%
Taxes will stabilize 2 8%
Crime will decrease 1 4%
Better schools 1 4%
Will be difficult to live
in city 1 4%
No rental units will exist 1 4%
More professional 1 4%
A condo glut will occur 1 4%
DATA TABLE 17
Will the waterfront area exclude itself from the rest of the
city?
No. of Participants : 14 Total Responses : 17
Participants Givin~ Same Response
No. Percent
Could become two cities
Could never truly disassociate
Waterfront will be distinctive
City have always been diverse
and waterfont area won't make
much difference
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7
6
3
1
41%
35%
18%
6%
Participants listed numerous problems in the city during
interviews. The reponses below indicate the problems
mentioned by participants. although no specific question
concerning problems was asked.
DATA TABLE 18
No. of Participants : 25 Total Responses: 103
Participants GiYing Same Response
No. Percent
- unspecified
- mayor can't control council
- Cucci is overwhelmed
- doesn't know how to deal with
development
- Gentrification is used for
political purposes
- fiscal mismanagement
- nepotism is rampant
- no professionalism
- lack of continuity in planning
- public is being lied to
- no major comprehensive waterfront
development plan
- favoritism in granting abatements
- blames ex-mayor McCann for giV-
ing city away
- City fails to advertise water-
front development
Problems with city politics and
the Cucci Administration
City isn't unified
Need more state support
Lack of infrastructure
Lack of pride in city
Results
17
11
10
9
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
3
2
89
5
5
3
1
19%
12%
11%
10%
7%
7%
6%
6%
6%
5%
3%
3%
3%
2%
83%
5%
5%
3%
1%
All participants agreed that Jersey City had improved
since the 1970s. However, the extent of the improvement is
uncertain. Generally. the benefits of revitalization ap-
peared to be more frequently cited than the negative as-
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peets, but there are strong indications that waterfront
revitalization is not perceived as beneficial to all city
residents.
Almost all participants described Jersey City as a
blue-collar town during the 1970s (Data Table 1). When
asked what was currently happening in the city, 43 percent
of the responses were positive - participants declared
Jersey City was experiencing promising times and new growth.
However, 26 percent noted increasing housing prices and
taxes (Data Table 2). The success of waterfront revitali-
zation was explained as being linked to New York City.
Lower rents and access to New York City were mentioned most
often, followed by the pro-development stance of the McCann
Administration. Together, these reasons constituted 86
percent of the responses (Data Table 3).
Responses concerning the positive and /or negative as-
pects of revitalization were mixed: 71 percent of the
responses were positive, chief among them, the perception
that revitalization would bring greater tax revenues. Al-
though only 29 percent cited negative aspects, 86 percent of
those responses mentioned that revitalization causes dis-
placement, creates higher property taxes , and creates the
need for more infrastructure. Two participants declared
that revitalization, had no negative aspects (Data Table 4).
Participants did not seem to believe that revitaliza-
tion benefitted everyone in the city. Responses indicated
that revitalization often assigned exclusionary benefits
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(19 percent), and was potentially harmful (19 percent).
Jobs created by waterfront revitalization went to outsiders.
not residents (19 percent) . Only 19 percent of the
responses concerned benefits projected for the future (Data
Table 5). Participants also believed that the public was
ambivalent about the changes taking place in the city .
Forty percent of the responses given indicated that the
public felt pride in revitalization and believed new oppor-
tunities and benefits were occurring, but 36 percent be-
lieved the public perceived changes negatively, and 20
percent were ambivalent (Data Table 6).
Not one participant believed that the public perceived
gentrification positively: at best . 28 percent of the
participants thought that the publiC· might give a positive
response, depending on who was asked, while 69 percent
believed the public perceived gentrification negatively.
Chief among the reasons given for this perception was that
not everyone benefits equally from revitalization (Data
Table 7).
Gentrification appeared to have a negative connotation,
perhaps reflective of past abuses or fears . Signs of gen-
trification as described by participants were generally
negative (Data Table 8). While only 26 percent of the signs
concerned items such as increasing landlord abuses, home-
lessness, and factory closings, participants tended not to
state very positive signs. Most participants thought that
Downtown was undergoing gentrification, followed by the
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Heights, Journal Square, and other pockets throughout the
city (Data Table 9). Eighty-five percent of all responses
explained the gentrification of city areas in terms of the
availability of transportation, access to New York City, and
low rents . These are similar responses to why Jersey City
began to revitalize in the first place (Data Table 10) .
Participants described newcomers as "yuppies" (16 per-
cent), followed by the perception that newcomers had dif-
ferent values (10 percent), were more active and politically
sophisticated (8.5 percent), and were less accepting of
"business as usual" (8 .5 percent). The descriptors are
generally derogatory (Data Table 11). The same holds true
for perceptions of long-time residents, who were described
as passive (33 percent), and suspicious of newcomers (21
percent) (Data Table 12). Participants readily admitted
that these perceptions were usually stereotypes and added
that not all newcomers or long-time residents fit the
stereotype. Eighty-one percent noted tensions between the
two groups, but only one participant claimed the tensions
had ever escalated into violence (Data Table 13). Concerns
between the two groups were also believed to be different
(Data Table 14).
Participants indicated that the most powerful tools the
Cucci Administration had to combat gentrification were its
linkage program for affordable housing, and stricter housing
ordinances (Data Table 15) . Most participants believed re-
vitalization would improve the city (19 percent). This was
142
followed by those who believed Jersey City would become an
extension of New York City (15 percent), and those indica-
ting the presence of housing problems (12 percent) (Data
Table 16). Forty-one percent believed that the differences
between the waterfront area and the rest of the city might
create two separate cities ; the rich waterfront area, and
the poor inner city. Thirty-five percent were convinced the
waterfront could never disassociate itself from the rest of
the city, and 18 percent of the responses stated the
waterfront would become distinctive (Data Table 17).
Gentrification seemed far less a concern to the parti-
cipants than problems with politics and the city government.
All participants criticized the state of affairs in the
city. Eighty-three percent of all responses concerned city
politics in general, and the Cucci Administration in partic-
ular (Data Table 18). In light of the some of the conclu-
sions concerning politics in the city (see Chapter 2) and
the preparation for the upcoming election in November this
may not seem surprising.
Discussion
Every political administration since the early 1970s
has tried to implement waterfront revitalization plans. It
is only in recent years that mixed-use projects have physi-
cally transformed the waterfront . This revitalization is
concentrated in a few wards, and some parts of the city
have yet to feel any impacts. Most demographic indicators
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showed positive gains, despite the rapidly shrinking housing
market and escalating housing prices (Chapter Three). The
increasing number of low-income families is particularly
alarming because it suggests a growing disparity between
economic classes. Some participants mentioned that until
recently, Jersey City never had an upper class.
The results of these interviews suggest that the
waterfront revitalization experience in Jersey City is not
perceived in the most positive light. Benefits appear to be
diffused, at best , and costs are difficult to assess. Most
striking is the diversity of opinion concerning the past and
the present.
In general , waterfront revitalization had a much more
positive connotation than gentrification. Perceptions
concerning gentrification were either ambivalent or nega-
tive . Participants were encouraged to define gentrification
in the manner they thought most appropriate , and many ex-
pressed difficulties in defining the actual and perceived
impacts and implications of gentrification . This was most
obvious among representatives of citizen participation
groups and waterfront developers. While the public was
believed to define gentrification in terms of rising prop-
erty taxes, loss of affordable housing, and displacement,
these two groups (as perceived by the respondents) often had
trouble defining what gentrification meant to them, and
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appeared to prefer gentrification to the conditions of the
1970s. These groups tended to concentrate on the costs and
benefits of revitalization and city problems.
It was expected that gentrification was an important
issue for the city as was indicated by much of the media
coverage during the mayoral election of 1984. By 1988,
however, gentrification, while still a concern for some city
council members and others, was overshadowed by numerous
other issues which include insufficient infrastructure,
deteriorating environmental quality (due to the industrial
nature of the city and congestion), inadequate transporta-
tion and concerns over increasing traffic, lack of afford-
able housing, and increasing taxes . Permeating all of this
is the political system, perceived by many as a relatively
unchanging reality.
Several participants suggested that the Cucci Admini-
stration played on the public 's fear of uncontrolled de-
velopment and used the term gentrification as a rallying
cry. They explained that some political groups convinced
the poor and the minorities that McCann was a direct threat
to their survival. Some participants were frankly doubtful
if gentrification had been the evil it. was made out to be,
and a few believed Cucci had won because the public had
become dissatisfied with McCann.
One particular point that must be addressed is issues
concerning perceptions of newcomers and long-time residents,
and the perceived tensions between the two groups. Jersey
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City has always been ethnically and socially diverse. The
city 's wards are often isolated from one another, and some
participants believed that gentrification and displacement
were only problems in Downtown. A few participants believed
that newcomers could be considered just another group coming
into the city. However, it is clear from the interviews
that resentment exists. Resentment also exists between some
of the long-time residents and recent immigrants. Asian
Indians, for instance, hav~ been- the victims of numerous
crimes. A few participants spoke of trying to bring both
groups together, but the city administration does not
recognize this as a major problem.
Many of the newcomers are members of a socio-economic
class that differs considerably from the rest of the city
population. Most representatives from the citizen partici-
pation groups could be termed newcomers. Most had bought
dilapidated brownstones in the Downtown Ward in the late
1970s or early 1980s and went to considerable effort to
renovate their properties. Newcomers thought the public
characterized them as ric~, real estate speculating, ex-New
Yorkers who cared nothing about the city . In fact, many of
the newcomers felt that their efforts in'trying to improve
their communities and city went largely unappreciated .
Furthermore , most resented the perception that they had
displaced poor people from their homes.
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The revitalization experience in Jersey City is best
described as mixed. The major benefits of revitalization
were perceived as increased tax revenues (ratables) and
additional jobs . However, participants were quick to point
out the social costs of revitalization, in particular, dis-
placement, housing problems, and increasing taxes. Partici-
pants also indicated that benefits were just starting and
certain groups (the poor, minorities , working class) were
largely excluded from this social and economic revival.
Some evidence exists to support the claim that revital-
ization has not benefitted the city as much as expected.
The public expects that the tax rate in the city will go
down due to increased ratables , a perception formented by
the city and developers. However, while the city revenues
have increased, the tax rate has increased as well . This
situation has lead to claims of fiscal mismanagement. The
following table illustrates this trend.
YEAR
1984
1985
1986
1987
ANNUAL CITY REVENUES
$ 91,752,263.00
97,628,812.83
116,803,338.60
134,917,682 .66
TAX RATE PER THOUSAND
$ 130.01
136.85
162.06
182.11
Source: Councilman Thomas Hart, Ward D, May 1988.
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Participants also believed that benefits from water-
front revitalization were not shared equally by city resi-
dents . Waterfront developers and the city promise tax
revenues and jobs. The public expects to realize these
benefits, but instead, taxes have risen , and many jobs
created by developments may not going to residents.
Approximately 44 percent of all Jersey City residents
currently work in the city (1985 Test Census , General
Population and Housing Statistics). Waterfront revitaliza-
tion projections call for an increase of over 96,000 jobs by
the year 2000 (Projected Waterfront Development, "Di vi s i on of
Urban Research & Design , 1988) . It is clear that more jobs
will be available , bu~ it is highly doubtful whether Jersey
City residents will be able to fill the expected demand for
managerial and professional positions . Many of the city's
residents were trained for industrial positions, positions
that no longer exist within the city. When construction
began along the waterfront , unions had difficulties finding
local workers and were forced to accept qualified union
workers from Louisiana , Mississippi, and Texas. As a re-
sult, incomes that could have supported the local economy
left the city. It was not until 1987 , largely due to the
efforts of the Jersey City Job Club , that Jersey City and
Hudson County residents were able to take advantage of the
construction boom in the city (Campbell , B., Feb 18-Feb 25,
1988). This was largely a result of the unions agreeing to
relax the entrance requirements for skilled workers.
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Programs initiated by the Jersey City Job Club have
placed thousands of residents in private sector positions
since its inception in 1982. During the last three years
almost 2,000 residents found jobs generating over $28 mil-
lion in incomes. However, most of these jobs are in the
construction or service sectors. The city worked with
Newport to create entry level and retail positions for city
residents, with limited success (Newport promotional litera-
ture; Interview Data. 1988). Management and technical posi-
tions go unfilled because neither the city administration
nor the school system anticipated the effects of revitali-
zation. While entry level positions are often filled
locally, top-level positions are filled by non-residents.
Coupled with the tendency of many firms to bring their
professionals with them, Jersey City residents do not appear
to reap the benefits of high-paying, prestigious management
and technical positions (Documents provided by Jersey City
Job Club; Interview Data, 1988).
The data presented above suggests that waterfront
revitalization has not yet provided the benefits that the
city administration and the public anticipated. Perceived
fears of gentrification appear to have diminished since
1984. Gentrification appears to be one of many issues
facing the city and has been incorporated under the litany
of affordable housing problems. However, gentrification was
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perceived as a problem by the Cucci Administration and
several efforts were made to mitigate its negative impacts.
The next section describes the actions taken by the city.
JERSEY CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT GENTRIFICATION
The Cucci Administration's response to gentrification
is to increase affordable housing . The linkage program was
cited most often by participants, followed by stricter
housing ordinances. First, however, it is necessary to
present some background on the housing situation in New
Jersey and Jersey City. This is followed by a description
of the Linkage program and the housing ordinances in Jersey
City.
Affordable Housin~ in New Jersey
The lack of affordable housing is a sta~e-wide problem
believed to be a combination of several factors, among them,
the Federal government's wi~hdrawal from the housing sector,
condominium converstions , gentrification, and inadequate
state programs to provide housing . Statewide. New Jersey
rents have gone up 140 percent since 1980, with the most
dramatic increases occuring since 1983 (Lynn. 1988). In the
landmark case, Southern Burlin~ton County NAACP v. The
Township of Mount Laurel 67 N.J. 151 (known as Mt. Laurel I)
in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court mandated that every
municipality must provide its fair share of affordable
housing. This decision was upheld in Southern Burlin~ton
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CQunty NAACP v. The TQwnship Qf MQunt Laurel 82 N.J. 158,
456 A2d. 390 (Mt. Laurel II) in 1983. The CQurt cQncluded
that 277,808 units Qf affQrdable hQusing were needed in the
state. The CQurt defined IQW incQme as less than 50 percent
Qf the cQunty median and mQderate incQme as 50 tQ 80 percent
Qf the median.
In respQnse tQ pressure Qn the state legislature tQ
prQvide a legislative, rather than judicial, mechanism fQr
affQrdable hQusing, the Fair HQusing Act Qf 1985 (P .L. 1985 ,
Chapter 222) was passed , which established the CQuncil Qn
AffQrdable HQusing. The CQuncil is cQmpQsed Qf private ci-
tizens, develQpers, and public Qfficials . In 1986, anQther
cQurt decisiQn, knQwn as Mt. Laurel III, reaffirmed the
priQr hQldings Qf Mt . Laurel I and II and intent Qf the Fair
-HQus i ng Act. All Mt. Laurel adjudicatiQn was transferred tQ
the CQuncil Qn AffQrdable HQusing. The cQuncil recalculated
the need fQr affQrdable hQusing tQ 145,707 units, and gave
credits fQr subsidized buildings built since 1980, envirQn-
mentally sensitive land cQnsidered unbuildable, and renQva-
ted hQuses . CQnseqently , municipalities were respQnsible
fQr building far less units. ApprQximately 2,000 units have
been build in cQmpliance with the Mt. Laurel decisiQns,
which is less than Qne percent Qf the estimated need
(DePalma, 1988).
The State has valienty pursued QptiQns tQ increase
affQrdable hQusing. AmQng them is a new prQject knQwn as
the Jersey Urban Multifamily PrQductiQn PrQgram (JUMPP).
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This program offers low-interest loans to developers setting
aside 25 percent of new apartments in urban areas for low-
income tenants. Federal subsidies and tax credits totalling
$18 million are reportedly available to the State for af-
fordable housing (Fisher and Blomquist, 1988). Another pro-
gram plans to use a public /private partnership to make $100
million in low-interest loans available for construction
(Cheslow, 1988).
Affo c'<;iable Housing in Jers.e.L.C..i-t~
The housing situation in Jersey City is considered
critical. The State of New Jersey estimates that Hudson
County needs 15.149 affordable units . Almost 40 percent of
these units are needed in Jersey City. While the Council on
Affordable Housing has mandated that Jersey City must pro-
vide 5.988 units of affordable housing, 20.000 units may be
a more realistic estimate. The situation in Jersey City may
be more critical than elsewhere in the State since Jersey
City has the highest renter-to-ownership ratio in the state
(70 percent) and 40 percent of all condominium conversions
in the State took place in Jersey City (Cheslow, 1988).
Approximately 37 percent of all household in Jersey City pay
30 percent of their income for rent (Housing Element and
Fair Share Plan, 1987). Approximately 14,010 conversions
have occurred since 1979, with 95 percent occurring since
1985 (see Chapter Three, Table 25).
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Displacement in Jersey City
Displacement is a contentious issue for the city
because no statistics exist that document the problem. The
definition of displacement and what it implies is disputed
(Holcomb and Beauregard, 1981; Lee and Hodge, 1981). The
significance of displacement is confirmed by Gale (1980),
but disputed by Grier and Grier (1980), Sumka (1980), Lang
(1982), and Schill and Nathan (1983). The only conclusion
among researchers is that if gentrification exists and
displacement occurs, it imposes the greatest costs on those
people least able to bear them (e.g., minorities, low-
income, elderly) (Fainstein et al., 1986; Holcomb and
Beauregard, 1981; Lang, 1982; Palen and London, 1984; and
Smith and Lafaivre, 1984), although Lee and Hodge (1984)
found little variation among racial and economic classes of
displaced persons. Furthermore, displacement is not unique
to revitalizing neighborhoods (DeGiovanni, 1984) and is not
restricted to cities (Lee and Hodge, 1984) .
Grier and Grier (1980) broadly define displacement as
the following:
Displacement occurs when any household is forced to
move from its residence by conditions which affect
the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which:
1. are beyond the household's reasonable ability to
control or prevent;
2. occur despite the household's having met all
previously-imposed conditions of occupany; and
3. make continued occupany by that household impos-
sible, hazardous, or unaffordable .
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Under this definition, displacement would therefore
occur through formal eviction notices, failure of landlords
to provide services, or sudden increases in taxes or rents,
which would raise housing costs beyond the occupants'
ability to pay. Displacement would not include voluntary
moves to more suitable housing, job-related moves, and
eviction due to occupant behavior that violates a lease.
Grier and Grier (1980) noted few statistics dealing
with displacement resulting from private investment or
gentrification, although displacement figures from publicly
financed projects are available . In Jersey City, such
figures are kept as part of the Community Development Block
Grant Program (CDBG) and include displacement occurring from
redevelopment projects, bUilding code enforcement, and fire.
CDBG monies are used to assist all displaced families .
Of much greater concern is the number of people invol-
untarily displaced who were unable to receive any sort of
relocation assistance . Most participants interviewed be-
lieved that the public defined gentrification and displace-
ment in terms of involuntary displacement resulting from
private market activities . City officials believed that
approximately 8,000 to 10,000 residents were displaced by
gentrification and that these persons left for other parts
of the city, other cities such as Newark , or left the state
entirely.
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A displacement registry compiled by the Office of
Tenants Assistance (part of the Department of Housing and
Economic Development) (OTA) is probably the only evidence of
involuntary displacement . The registry was developed as an
internal working project in 1986. The registry only
includes people who come to the office and the results may
be erroneous due to inaccurate recordkeeping. While the
results are circumspect, the number of displaced persons
more than doubled between 1986 (217 displaced) and 1987 (496
displaced). OTA defines displacement as actual or imminent
displacement resulting from eViction, rent increases which
exceed the income of tenants, fire, condemnation, condomini-
um or cooperative conversion, or illegal evictions. The
registry is no longer kept.
Even if statistics do not exist, displacement is very
real to many people in the city . The Cucci Administration
has worked to create more stringent housing ordinances to
protect tenants, in response. to the illegal evictions , and
landlord abuses which occurred during the McCann Admini-
stration. The following sections describe the programs and
ordinances implemented by the Cucci Administration .
Affordable Housing Linkage Program
This program is the most cited weapon in Jersey City's
arsenal to fight gentrification. The program, under the
aegis of the Department of Housing and Economic Development,
was formulated in August 1985. It incorporates a number of
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-me as ur e s initiated by the City to encourage affordable
housing as mandated by the Fair Housing Act (N.J.S.A. 52:
270-311). The linkage program "links" market rate housing
and commercial and office development to the subsidization
of inner city affordable housing. A linkage program is
considered a type of exaction, which ideally should allocate
the burdens of development among the developers and the
public . A description of the program follows.
The program is voluntary and based on guidelines. It
is not an ordinance. The Jersey City program is based on a
similar program in San Francisco. It assumes that the
development community will voluntarily participate out of
concern and consideration for the city and a sense of social
justice. The goal of the program is to capture some of the
benefits of revitalization for the city.
Developers are encouraged to create affordable housing
by (1) building or rehabilitating low and moderate income
units as part of their development projects. (2) financing
or sponsoring affordable housing elsewhere in the city, or
(3) contributing payments to a municipally established
housing trust fund to be used by the Department of Housing
and Economic Development to sponsor affordable housing
throughout the city. Developers are urged to construct
units. rather than make financial contributions.
Residential developers of all new or substantially
rehabilitated housing developments must set aside 10 percent
of all units for low and moderate income housing . Certain
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developments are excluded from this requirement, and include
developments under 10 units, developments already subsidized
or financed by Federal or state subsidies or bonds to build
affordable housing, developments sponsored by non-profit
housing development corporations, or developments designed
to meet the needs of special population groups (e.g.,
elderly, handicapped). Residential developers may provide
units within the same development, build units outside the
development, but within the same neighborhood, or make an in
lieu cash contribution to the city trust fund.
Developers of new or substantially rehabilitated
commercial and office complexes must provide affordable
housing based on a formula that estimates the likely impact
of the project on the demand for housing in Jersey City. In
an effort to encourage construction of actual units instead
of financial contributions, developers may reduce their
trust fund contributions by 20 percent if they (1) provide
below market financing to low and moderate income home
purchases, or (2) provide financing for the construction of
affordable housing ("affordable" refers to households at 80
percent of the applicable median income level paying no more
than 30 percent of their incomes for total housing
expenses). Finally, developers who wish to provide actual
housing instead of cash payments can reduce their housing
responsibility by 80 percent.
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The program also provides for case-by-case determin-
ations to be made if projects face financial hardships due
to site-specific conditions. An additional incentive to
developers who provide 15 percent of more affordable units
is a promise that the Department of Housing and Economic
Development will accelerate or "fast track" project reviews
and approvals. The program also provides safeguards to
ensure that the developer maintains all affordable housing
commitments. All affordable units will remain affordable to
low and moderate income tenants in the future through
lO-year liens and deed restrictions.
Affordable housing will also be financed through UDAG
payback funds. CDBG float loan interest payments, proceeds
of sales of residential and non-residential city-owned
property . interest from escrow accounts , funds from the
Housing Demonstration Fund of the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs, and suburban contributions from Mt.
Laurel II settlements. 1
All redevelopments plans after 1985 incorporate the
Affordable Housing Linkage Program as a goal. Redevelopment
plans are mandatory for any blighted area to be redeveloped
under the Redevelopment Agencies Law CN.J.S.A . 46:55C-l ~
~) Redevelopment plans have become increasingly
detailed. The plans list the objectives of redevelopment.
acceptable redevelopment actions. and design criteria.
While the plans are guidelines for redevelopment, they do
set out the goals of the city. Developers wishing to
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redevelop an area of the city must submit a plan that
conforms with the goals, gUidelines, and specifics of the
pertinent redevelopment plan. Consequently, plans could be
important policy statements.
Redevelopment plans tend to be similar and list public
access, transportation, infrastructure improvement, parking,
design, and housing/employment opportunities as objectives.
Plans also mention the unique geographical location of
Jersey City and varying degrees of design specification.
However, two plans created after 1985 include balanced
development as an objective to conform with the State Fair
Housing Act (1985) and the Housing Element and Fair Share
Plan (1987) (Exchange Place Redevelopment Plan, August 1987;
Exchange Place North Redevelopment Plan, August 1987). The
redevelopment plan for Exchange Place North is considered to
be the most detailed plan to date (Interview Data, 1988) .
Problems with the Linka~e Pro~ram
The Linkage program is officially a voluntary program
but is mandatory for developers who wish to build or reno-
vate in Jersey City. Simply stated, it represents the "cost
of doing business" in the city. The Department of Housing
and Economic Development negotiates with developers on a
case-by-case basis for on or offsite affordable housing
units or contributions to the affordable housing trust fund.
One major problem is that some phases and plans for develop-
ments were already well underway before the linkage program
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was implemented. The Cucci administration inherited many of
the redevelopment plans drafted under the McCann administra-
tion. Amending redevelopment plans and renegotiating with
developers was difficult at best. Consequently, the city
lost many opportunities to urge developers to create
affordable housing (Interview Data, 1988).
The Housing Element and Fair Share Plan (1987), created
in response to the New Jersey Fair Housing Act (1985), esti-
mated that Jersey City would surpass the 5,988 affordable
housing units mandated by the State Council on Affordable
Housing. These units must be built by 1993. Jersey City
anticipated that through existing programs, in-rem units2
available for redevelopment, already created housing, and
the linkage program, 9,474 units would be produced. The
Linkage Program alone would create 2,500 units.
In 1987, Newport provided 273 units of middle-income
housing in its rental towers. In May 1988, ground was
broken for 38 affordable homes as a result of an agreement
between the city and First Jersey National Bank (developers
of the Evertrust Building at Exchange Place) to provide
off-site housing. First Jersey is providing $2.5 million in
low interest loans and mortages to create townhouses that
can be sold for about $53,000 to 4 or 5 member families who
earn up to $21,500. The bank reportedly will also waive
closing fees and aid residents in securing fixed-rate
mortgages. To prevent speculators from selling the prop-
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erties for profit, a clause in the deed will prohibit homes
from appreciating more than 5 percent a year (DeRogatis, May
20, 1988).
Table 26 lists the Affordable Housing projects by de-
veloper and linkage contribution. The details of the on and
offsite housing are still being negotiated. Approximately
1,217 more units will be built as a result of developers'
commitments to the linkage programs (DeRogatis, May 20,
1988) .
The effectiveness of this program is debatable . Two
years passed before the units at Newport were bUilt, and
ironically, the developer is having difficulties renting the
units to families who fit into the stringent Federal
moderate-income housing guidelines (Interview Data, 1988).
The townhouses contributed by First Jersey are expected to
be completed by late summer (DeRogatis, May 20, 1988).
While most of the City Officials /Administrators inter-
viewed supported the linkage program, the actual success of
the program to date is less clear. Only 311 units have been
built or will be built in the near future . With the press-
ing need for housing , the public often does not realize the
delicate and time-consuming negotiations that must take
place prior to any units being built . Consequently, they
tend to be critical of the administration, which ran on a
platform to create more affordable housing for low and
moderate income residents . A few of the participants
suspected that no money actually existed in the linkage
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TABLE 26
Affordable Housinq Project9
Harket-rate Development
Cali Office Building
Grove Street
Por~ Liber~e-Caven Point
rle·,.;por~ (Phase I)
Lafaye~te Park
Johnson/Pacific
Park Ha~ilton
10~h and Grove St.
Portside
,1 Washington Streec
first Jersey Office Bldg.
Exchange Place
Dixon Crucible
Christopher Columbus Drive
Shearson/Anerican Express
Liberty Harbor North
Harsimus Cove South
Liberty Center
(~lorgan and Bay)
Clcr:r.ont Cove
One Greene Screec
66 York Street
601 Pavonia Avenue
Re s e r vo i r' View
J~tr~~scn/C2ntr3l
Linkage Contribution
Rehab 5 buildings with
80-100 units as affordable
condominiums
Bergen Ave.-Orien~ Avenue
5500 con~ribu~ion per market
uni~ sold-sweac equicy project.
(si~e ~o be de~er~ined)
271 below ~arke~ rate ren~al
aparcmencs - Q~ ~~
44 ~ownhouses on sice
10 unit condo brownscon~
at 207 15ch Streec-rehub
S6JO.000 towards rehab of
56 rental units in 4 buildings
in Bergen Corridor
Will conscrucc 40 J-bedroom
townhouses
Woodward Streec
82 rentals - on site
51 .2 million concribution
50 units - off site
(site to ce deter~ined)
5750 per unit sold
50\ nec revenue from
inceri~ parking
75 rental unics
5150. 000 c o n t ri b u c i o n t o w.a rr ln
rencal rehub.
510.000 c cnt~ibution to Habica t
for Huraa n i r y
5:0.000 concribucion co Habicac
for P.u::lanity
7 rencal ~~ics on s i c e
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
JERSEY CITY, NJ, 1988
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program. One participant termed the entire program a sort
of "kickbacks" that were not too different from the kinds of
things Mayor "Boss " Hague used to request (Interview Data,
1988). Ironically , under the McCann administration, per-
ceived as being pro-development, anti-tenant, anti-poor and
anti-minority, 900 units of low and moderate income housing
were created (Interview Data, 1988).
Stricter Housing Ordin~nces
In keeping with its tactic of fighting gentrification
and increasing affordable housing, the Cucci Administration
strengthened many of the city ordinances concerning tenants
rights and supplemented state housing laws with municipal
ordinances. This was in response to their campaign promise,
as well as an attempt to mitigate the perceived landlord
abuses of the McCann Administration. The major housing law
fiasco by the McCann Administration was believed to be an
ordinance concerning rent increases on substantially reha-
bilated rental units. Many of the units were bought by
speculators, allegedly "improved," and rented again at
higher rates. The units then came under rent control . Many
of the stories of tenants being locked out of their apart-
ments , displaced, and harassed stemmed from this ordinance
(Interview Data , 1988). The following section briefly
describes the codes designed to create and preserve
affordable housing.
163
Multiple Dwelling Rent Controls (Municipal Code 13:123-147)
In 1986, this ordinance was passed as an emergency
measure to preserve affordable rental housing. Under this
code, rental increases could only occur upon the termination
of a lease. Rent could not be increased more than 4 per-
cent. Rent increases due to substantial improvements where
the improvement exceeded 50 percent of the unit 's currently
assessed value, could not exceed 15 percent of the previous
rent. Only one substantial improvement increase per year is
permitted. However, landlords could apply for a hardship
rental increase, which is granted only if the landlord can
demonstrate that he or she is unable to meet mortgage pay-
ments, operating expenses, or make a fair return (6 percent)
on the investment. Landlords must file the monthly base
rents of all rental units with the Office of Rent Leveling.
The Office and the Rent Leveling Board was established to
review rents, rental increases, review applications for rent
increases, and hear tenant complaints against landlords.
Unlawful Harassment and Eviction of Tenants (Municipal Code
13:156-160)
This ordinance was incorporated into the municipal code
in 1986 and was designed to supplement N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1 and
2A:33-1. Landlords were prohibited from harassing and using
physical violence toward tenants, discontinuing services,
failing to abate code violations, removing tenant's posses-
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sions, removing or changing the lock or door to an unit, or
changing the lock . Violations are sUbject to fines of
$500.
Prohibition A~ainst The Withholding of Certain Residential
Units from Rental Housing Market (Anti-Warehousing Law)
(Municipal Code 13:156-160)
This code was enacted in 1987 due to the prevalence of
owners of rental units to withhold units from the rental
market in order to increase property values. Under this
code, rental units had to be rented and occupied by new
tenants within 60 days after the previous tenant left.
Real Estate Canva~sing (Municipal Code 13:162-166)
This code was enacted in 1987 to prevent real estate
canvassers from coercing homeowners into selling their
property on the basis of alleged neighborhood racial ,
religious , or ethnic composition changes. Canvassers had to
notify owners of visits , and were prohibited from visiting
if requested by an owner. Furthermore , canvassers were
specificially prohibited from claiming property values and
services would decrease and crime rates would increase due
to neighborhood change. Non-discrimination in housing and
public accommodations was guaranteed under the Fair Housing
and Public Accommodation Ordinance that same year (Municipal
Code 13:167-174) .
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Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Laws
As indicated in Chapter Three, condomimium and
cooperative conversions have escalated since 1980. Since
the start of the Cucci Administration, over 13 ,000 conver-
sions have been registered. As Jersey City is already over
70 percent renter-occupied, any additional conversions are
perceived by the public as extremely detrimental. Conver-
sions are considered to substantially and permanently reduce
the amount of rental housing (DeFina , March 13, 1988).
Under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.8 , landlords intending to con-
vert apartment buildings into condominiums must issue a
notice of intent to convert and a full plan of the conver-
sion. Tenants are able to bUy their apartments if they so
desire before the unit is placed on the market. Further-
more, tenants cannot be evicted from their apartments until
at least three years after the notice of intent to convert
is received. Tenants can request that their landlord offer
them the opportunity to look at and rent reasonable housing.
This means that the owner or owner's agent must offer the
tenant a apartment that meets the standards of comparable
housing. If the tenant can satisfactorily prove the land-
lord did not offer such. a one-year stay (in the current
apartment) is provided by the court. Tenants can receive up
to five one-year stays (N .J.S.A. 2A:18-61.11). Disabled and
elderly tenants can receive special protection under under
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N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61:22 et seq. If disabled and elderly
tenants meet certain age, tenancy, and income requirement,
they cannot be evicted for 40 years.
While the state law appears to offer adequate protec-
tion to tenants, most tenants vacate their units after five
years (Interview Data, 1988). On the average, conversions
can be expected to displace up to 20 percent of all minori-
ty, elderly, and low-income tenants (Romaneillo, 1987).
Also, seemingly protected tenants have been sUbjected to
harassment by landlords, which can include lease restric-
tions and reductions in services. Violations of state and
municipal codes cannot be prosecuted unless tenants are
aware of their rights and are willing to complain. To in-
form tenants and landlords of their rights and obligations,
Jersey City established the Office of Tenants Assistance in
1986. The office provides and disseminates information to
landlords and tenants regarding Federal, state, and munici-
pal laws that affect rights and duties of both tenants and
landlords. The office also provides advise and counseling
to tenants. Of the 6,626 tenants who utilized these ser-
vices. 53 percent were classified as low income and very low
income (Data from the Office of Tenants Assistance for 1986
and 1987).
Jersey City's emergency solution to escalating
condo conversions and rapidly decreasing affordable housing
was to pass the Affordable Housing Preservation Ordinance
(Municipal Code 13:161-172) in 1987. The city refused to
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accept any new notices of intention to convert condos.
Also, a voluntary affordable home ownership program was
created whereby tenants could purchase units or chose to
continue renting. Conversions of ownership are allowed if
no tenants are displaced, and the bUilding meets certain
standards. Affordability is guaranteed through subsidies
and restrictions on resale prices. Owner and rental prices
are calculated to give a fair return to the landlord. This
ordinance was overturned by the court, although the city is
currently appealing the decision.
Problems with Housing Ordinances
Admirable as Jersey City's stricter housing ordinances
are, only 42.5 percent of the housing units are covered by
rent protection (Housing Element and Fair Share Plan, 1987).
Affordable housing is being built. for example, funds from
JUMPP and other state sources will provide 59 low and moder-
ate income housing units (Wihtol, 198~), and the linkage
program has producted 311 units. While progress is being
made, it may not be fast enough for the public.
Members of the City Council generally believed that
their efforts had improved the housing ordinance, although
at least two councilpersons had reservations about the
impacts of rent control . If the McCann Administration could
be characterized as being pro-landlord, the Cucci Adminis-
stration would be labeled as pro-tenant . Two participants
from the Citizen Participation Group suggested that the
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ordinances were too stringent and landlords found it diffi-
cult to meet their expenses. Violations under housing laws
are rather lenient - penalities usually consist of a fine of
$500 and/or 90 day imprisonment . Also, newly constructed
dwellings within a redevelopment area are exempt from these
ordinances (all waterfront projects are in redevelopment
areas).
To complicate matters, while state officials agree that
a severe affordable housing crisis exists (Wihtol, 1987;
Cheslow , 1988) and much of the new housing being build is
not affordable (Lynn, 1988; Wihtol, 1988), not everyone
agrees on the methods used to create affordable housing. It
is questionable if condominium conversions will continue,
and a condo glut may be evident soon (Bendel, 1988; Inter-
view pata, 1988) . Rent control is also a contentious issue
and is accused of perpetuating the housing crisis and creat-
ing new abuses such as bargins with landlords (DeRuggiero,
1988). Problems of landlords and the plight of people who
fall above the moderate-income category may be ignored
(Interview Data, 1988, DeRuggiero, 1988) . The very
definition of what constitutes affordable housing (e.g., a
family of four earning under $21,000 a year is considered
moderate income) and whether the poor actually benefit is
also debatable (DePalma, 1988).
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ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Obviously, there are no simple answers to the housing
crisis. This problem is compounded by waterfront revitali-
zation. Recent problems that have received attention relate
to infrastructure, transportation/traffic, and environmental
quality . Each of these topics and the municipal and state
solutions will be addressed briefly .
Infrastructure
Like many other older cities, Jersey City is plagued
with insufficient infrastructure to deal with the massive
waterfront revitalization that is occurring . At least $100
million of infrastructure improvements are needed (Housing
Element and Fair Share Plan, 1987). Currently, most new
roads, sewers, utility wires, etc., are provided by water-
front developers due to state requirements for waterfront
and sewer permits. Much of the waterfront did not have ade-
quate, if any, infrastructure during the era of the rail-
roads . The Engineering Department negotiates with develop-
ers on a case-by-case basis to provide the necessary infra-
structure. This may change if the city establishes an
infrastructure impact fee. This would add conditions as
well as provide some seed funds to develop the necessary
infrastructure.
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TranspQrtatiQn/Traffic
Substantial increases in traffic alQng already CQn-
gested and narrQW rQads are expected. At the least, water-
frQnt revitalizatiQn will bring 9,900 additiQnal cars during
the mQrning rush hQur and 11,569 additiQnal cars during the
evening rush hQur. These figures dQ nQt include the impacts
Qf smaller prQjects away frQm the waterfrQnt (DeRQgatis, May
19-26, 1988). Parking is already a prQblem in Jersey City,
which has lQng been used as cQnvenient parking lQt fQr
cQmmuters Qn their way tQ Manhattan.
In respQnse tQ grQwing transpQrtatiQn needs, the state
created a waterfrQnt transpQrtatiQn Qffice tQ cQQrdinate
traffic planning by municipalities, develQpers, and state
agencies. A prQpQsed light rail system, running frQm
Greenville in Jersey City tQ Weehawken, and a waterfrQnt
bQulevard, stretching frQm Jersey City's sQuthern bQrder tQ
Edgewater, will nQt be cQmpleted until the mid-1990s
(DeRQgatis, May 19-22, 1988). A transpQrtatiQn study by NJ
Transit tQ determine bus rQutes and service levels fQr the
present and future in HudsQn CQunty is expected tQ be
cQmpleted in December 1988 (The RecQrd. Sept. 23, 1987).
EnyirQnmental Quality
EnvirQnmental prQblems are particularly prevalent alQng
fQrmerly industrial sites, and Jersey City has already been
faced with hydrQcarbQn cQntaminatiQn in NewpQrt (Stapinski,
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1988) and chrominum contamination (Temes, 1988). Chrome-
manufacturing plants were prevalent in the city between
1930 to 1960.
Air quality in Hudson County is already one of the
worst air pollution problems in the country and Jersey City
has been in violation of Federal limits for carbon-monoxide
levels (Reyneri, 1988). Increased traffic and continued
development only compound the problem. Some participants
questioned the need for more development in an already
congested environment (Interview Data, 1988).
The State is proposing conducting a regional air
quality study as part of the environmental impact statement
for the light-rail system but this could take more than two
years to complete (Reyneri, 1988) . The city created a
volunteer group known as the Jersey City Environmental
Commission in 1986 to educate the public, plan for the
future. and advocate on behalf of the environment and the
city. Previously. such efforts were largely restricted to
neighborhood groups who worked with public officials
concerning environmental issues .
SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis advanced for this thesis was that
attitudes concerning the effects of gentrification along the
urban waterfront can be a powerful force in determining the
nature in which waterfront revitalization is conducted.
This hypothesis would not be rejected if evidence was found
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of (1) perceptions of gentrification, and (2) policies
relating to gentrification. The results of the interview
demonstrate that perceptions of gentrification do exist,
although how much displacement has resulted from gentrifi-
cation cannot be quantified. Several city reports have
mentioned the existence of gentrification . Furthermore,
both redevelopment plans and city housing ordinances have
been strengthened to provide affordable housing and mitigate
the worst effects of gentrification due to waterfront
redevelopment. Consequently, the results of this thesis
lend some evidence to support the hypothesis that decisions
made by elected officials and administrators in Jersey City
are directly affected by the public's negative perceptions
of gentrification among the urban waterfront, and these
perceptions have influenced the morphology and structure of
coastal developments . However, despite this, perceptions of
gentrification do not appear to be as powerful as they were
previously . Also, only one facet of the decision-making
process was considered, and there may be additional factors
influencing the waterfront revitalization policies that were
not identified in this study .
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX
1The Fair Housing Act of 1985 allows Regional
Contribution Agreements (RCAs) whereby one municipali~iy can
make a contribution to another community to help fulfill its
obligation to provide affordable housing. Three years
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passed before the first RCA was accepted by the Council on
Affordable Housing (New York Times. April 3, 1988). Five
suburban communities are currently considering transferring
units to Jersey City, which means that these communities
would provide funds to build affordable housing in Jersey
City, rather than in their own communities (The Record.
March 8, 1988). Critics claim RCAs allow suburbs to exclude
the poor and violate the intent of the Fair Housing Act and
the Mt. Laurel decisions. Proponents claim the RCAs allow
people to stay within their own communities and provide
affordable housing where it is most needed. A final point
of contention is that the funds provided under this program
are minimal and must be supplemented with other sources
(Campbell, C., May 20, 1988).
2Units that have been obtained by the city, usually
through delinquent taxes.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Waterfront revitalization has become a popular alterna-
tive for many cities and municipalities wishing to bring
vigor and appeal to formerly underutilized properties. The
waterfront, often perceived as an industrial, disreputable
area. is now the place to be. Developers and pol~ticians
claim· that revitalization of the waterfront can create
housing. economic. and recreational opportunities. High-
technology, multi-faceted complexes are lining the urban
coast .
Although the rush to develop the waterfront is far from
over, some cities and municipalities have found that water-
front revitalization creates new problems and exacerbates
old ones. Changes in the urban landscape and land use
patterns. under the guise of revitalization, may create
unanticipated side effects. Many of these effects have been
discussed in the urban revitalization literature. but very
little has been devoted to the problems of revitalizing
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waterfronts. This thesis recognizes this omission and has
discussed the waterfront revitalization experience,
including the multitude of problems connected with it.
The specific purpose of this thesis was to examine the
phemonenon of gentrification along the urban waterfront.
City officials and administrators' perceptions of gentrifi-
cation were examined to determine their probable impacts on
the waterfront. Specifically, it was postulated that per-
ceptions of gentrification among ~his group could be a
powerful force in determining the nature in which waterfront
revitalization is conducted . Attitudes of other groups - .
citizen participation groups, waterfront developers, and the
media - were also assessed to obtain a more complete picture
of the situation. The hypothesis would be supported if
evidence was found of both negative perceptions of gentrifi-
cation among city officials and administrators, and corre-
sponding policies related to mitigating gentrification.
This hypothesis was tested by researching the water-
front revitalization experience in Jersey City, N.J. - an
area that is undergoing massive land use changes. The city
is projected to be the future home of almost 60,000 new
residents, and over 24,000,000 square feet of office,
commercial, retail, and residential space. No other area in
the metropolitan New York area can rival Jersey City in
terms of the volume of anticipated development and potential
impacts. For these reasons, Jersey City was chosen as the
study site to test the above hypothesis.
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Data to support the hypothesis was obtained from
detailed personal interviews conducted with city officials,
administrators, developers, citizen groups, and media rep-
resentatives. City documents, ordinances, policies, and
regulations relating to gentrification and waterfront re-
vitalization were reviewed. The interviews were expected to
reveal negative perceptions of gentrification and provide
insights into the revitalization experience. If perceptions
existed, it was expected that they would be translated into
policy statements and appear in city document, ordinances,
and regulations. The results of the interviews and
assessment of city documents are detailed in Chapter Six,
and demonstrate that waterfront revitalization has not
necessarily fulfilled the expectations of the public.
The level of development, its benefits, and who
receives those benefits was a major issue in the November
1984 mayoral campaign. A new political administration was
assembled on a ticket based on the notion that development
was uncontrollable and potentially harmful, and gentrifica-
tion was rampant. This administration's plan of attack
against excessive development and inequities in the dis-
tribution of benefits was to create and maintain affordable
housing in the city, including the waterfront. By enabling
long-time residents to continue to live in the city, while
continuing to attract new residents, the administration
expected to create a vital, liveable city for all people,
not just a select few.
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Although the Cucci Administration promised sensible
development, once the wheels of development were initiated,
it was difficult to actually halt development. Many of the
projects were inherited from the previous administration,
which had committed itself to these developments. The Cucci
Administration did not attempt to halt projects that had
already been approved, an obviously insurmountable task, but
it did try to acquire more benefits from developers,
primarily in the form of the Affordable Housing Linkage
Program, and infrastructure exactions. A problem that the
city has and will continue to grapple with is how much can
be asked of developers before the "cost of doing business"
in the city becomes excessive and Jersey City looses its
competitive advantage?
The results of the interviews indicate that partici-
pants believe the publiC defines gentrification negatively
and considers it a threat. While the 1984 mayoral election
was not won solely on the gentrification issue, this was
cited as one of several related issues, which included
housing, displacement, and further development. City docu-
ments discussed in Chapter Six support the existence of
gentrification. The affordable housing ordinances and
linkage programs were direct attempts to solve or at least
mitigate the lack of affordable housing . While the
deficiency of affordable housing cannot be blamed solely on
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new developments in the city, it was often cited as
resulting from waterfront revitalization and sUbsequent
revitalization efforts.
Waterfront revitalization has created physical changes.
although the social and economic changes are just beginning.
The city officials and administrators were more concerned
with other problems. including the lack of affordable hous-
ing, infrastructure, and growing disparities between the
rich and the poor. Gentrification was not one of the major
problems currently confronting the city administration.
Perceptions of waterfront revitalization, which had a more
positive connotation than gentrification, were mixed. Par-
ticipants stated that revitalization would ·t r ans l at e into
increased tax revenues, ratables, jobs, and opportunities.
Preliminary data presented in Chapter Six shows that much of
these anticipated developments have yet to occur. Tax
revenues have not lowered the tax rate, although ratables
have increased. Job creation does not appear to benefit the
majority of residents, and opportunites may soon disappear.
Thus far, the city has only experienced a physical altera-
tion of the waterfront as it was converted from an indus-
trial waterfront to a mixed-use complex largely devoted to
housing. commercial. and retail space. as well as an
onslaught of additional problems.
The externalities of revitalization - cited as
displacement , higher property taxes . and exclusion of some
groups - were more evident . Displacement is a highly
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contentious issue. City officials and administrators and
other participants. such as those from the media and citizen
participation groups, differed considerably as to the extent
and impacts of displacement. Property taxes have also in-
creased. Some evidence was found to support the statement
that some groups are excluded from the benefits of revitali-
zation. although at best, the benefits to the entire city
are diffused . Additional externalities include environment-
al quality concerns and the ever-present affordable housing
squeeze.
Jersey City has been changing physically and socially
since the early 1980s . However, the future impact of the
social changes are difficult to assess, although many of
them could be attributed to waterfront revitalization. It
is likely that after so many years of promises by different
politicans that many residents never expected to witness
gleaming, modern complexes along the waterfront, and are
unsure of what is happening to the city. While some
participants stated that residents were demonstrating more
pride, revitalization does not appear to have distributed
many benefits to the public, let alone equally throughout
the city.
While the data demonstrates that, at least in the case
of Jersey City, perceptions of gentrification have obviously
influenced policies related to the waterfront, other
unidentified factors may also have an impact. Furthermore,
the effectiveness of these policies in mitigating gentrifi-
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cation was not fully tested. Preliminary assessment shows
that condomimium conversions and displacement continue to
increase. and revitalization does not appear to bring about
benefits that are distributed equally throughout the city.
The public is not placated by the promises of the benefits
of revitalization, while they attempt to deal with the lack
of affordable housing, increasing taxes, and numerous other
problems. Rightly or wrongly. as in the past , they will
blame the current administration for not living up to its
promises .
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APPENDIX A
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HOBOKEN JERSEY CITY DATE: _
Participant : _
BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES
How would you describe the character of Jersey City
(Hoboken)? As ethnically diverse?
How would you describe what is currently happening in Jersey
City? (Hoboken)?
How would you describe conditions in Jersey City (Hoboken)
between 1970 and 1980? (demography, community spirit ,
economics, fiscal stability)
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How has Jersey City (Hoboken) changed since 1980? Why has
Jersey City (Hoboken) suddenly been "discovered?"
Specifically. how has the waterfront area changed in recent
years?
Is revitalization having positive and /or negative effects in
Jersey City (Hoboken)? In particular. the Waterfront area?
(possible answers)
Benefits Costs
- more tax revenues - displacement
- better image of city - higher property taxes
- fiscal stability - conflicts between newcomers and
long-time residents
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GENTRIFICATION ISSUES
How would you define gentrification?
How do you believe the general public defines gentrification?
What is the public 's perception of the changes taking place
in Jersey City (Hoboken)? (What factors do you base your
answer on?)
Would you describe some of the signs of gentrification?
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Gentrification tends to occur selectively. Which wards are
currently affected by or undergoing gentrification?
Ward A - Greenville
Ward B - Westside
Ward C - Journal Square
Ward D - Heights
Ward E - Downtown
Ward F - Bergen
Why?
What is the official position on revitalization and the
possibility of sUbsequent gentrification?
How would you describe newcomers? (socioeconomic
differences , racial differences. differences in attitudes)
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How would you describe long-time residents? (socioeconomic
differences, racial differences, differences in attitudes)
Would the general public concur with your description? If
not, how would the general public describe newcomers and
long-time residents?
Do tensions between newcomers and long-time residents exist?
If tensions exist, what form have they taken? (e .g .,
physical violence, verbal confrontation , general ill
feelings)
Do concerns among newcomers and long-time residents differ?
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POLITICS
How has the government of Jersey City (Hoboken) been affected
by gentrification?
What political implications does gentrification have?
Has the City taken any steps to control gentrification?
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HOUSING ISSUES
How would you characterize the current housing market market
in Jersey City (Hoboken)? How has it changed over time?
Is there a shortage of affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income people? Why?
What is the city doing to increase the amount of affordable
housing? Ordinances
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DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
How much new development is conducted by the private sector?
How much by the public sector?
How cooperative is the city in issuing permits for projects?
How cooperative have developers been?
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NEWPORT
Jersey City has a rather unique agreement with the Newport
developers to provide low- and moderate-income housing units.
Will this be a requisite for other developers? Is this how
Jersey City plans to acquire low- and moderate-income
housing? .
How responsive are developers to concerns by the city and
nei~hborhood associations? (landscaping to hide a parking
garage)
How active have neighborhood organizations been in directing
the future of the oity?
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What is the future of the city?
Will the waterfront area exclude itself from the rest of the
City?
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